INTEGRATION OF SOFTWARE SAFETY ASSURANCE PRINCIPLES WITH AN AGILE DEVELOPMENT METHOD by Doss, Osama
  
 
 
 
 
INTEGRATION OF SOFTWARE SAFETY ASSURANCE PRINCIPLES WITH AN 
AGILE DEVELOPMENT METHOD 
 
 
 
 
                                                  Osama Doss 
 
 
 
 
                 MSc by Research 
 
 
 
 
                                                          University of York 
                                                          Computer Science 
 
 
 
 
                                                          May 2016 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
Agile software development has had success in different domains. However there is one 
area where the implementation of agile methods still needs significant development – that 
is in the field of agile and safety-critical system development. In this field, software 
engineering processes need to be justified against the requirements of software safety 
assurance standards (such as ISO 26262 in the automotive domain). It is therefore 
important that agile development processes can be justified to levels of assurance 
equivalent to that provided by traditional development approaches. While there is existing 
literature concerning the integration of agile methods with specific safety-critical system 
development standards and agile methods, the question of how fundamental software safety 
assurance principles can be addressed within agile methods has received little attention. In 
this thesis we describe the results of practitioner surveys that highlight the primary 
concerns regarding the use of agile methods within safety-critical development. In the 
context of this survey, and of existing work on software safety assurance principles, we 
then present an initial proposal as to how assurance could be addressed with an existing 
agile development method – Scrum. This proposal was submitted to practitioners for initial 
feedback and evaluation. The results of this evaluation are also presented.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction                                             
 
 
 
Agile methods are known for being fast, efficient and adaptive, as well as for fostering 
discipline and good practices in engineers. It is claimed that the use of agile methods can 
support both quality and team productivity [26]. Agile methodologies have grown in 
popularity in software development since the presentation of the Agile Manifesto in 
2001[40]. They are intended to produce software of higher quality and lower cost [41], 
while satisfying both employers and stakeholders. 
 
Safety-critical systems are those where the system can either cause harm to humans or the 
environment, or is responsible for preventing such harm. There are many such systems, for 
example, in the railway, medical devices and automotive domains. Most safety-critical 
systems must be certified by a regulatory agency (or at least independently assessed) to 
ensure that they are safe for deployment, and that appropriate development and verification 
practices have been applied. It is therefore important that adherence to the objectives of the 
relevant standards can be demonstrated [26]. 
 
Evidence and experience concerning the integration of Agile in the field of safety-critical 
software development is limited. However, there are some published case studies and 
research on successes or failures/ problems in that field, (e.g. [42,43,44]). Since the 
development of safety-related software is generally governed by standards, we need to 
investigate whether it is possible to use agile methods that are flexible with respect to 
planning, documentation and specification while still being acceptable by standards [45]. In 
particular, we need to consider how a structured argument providing assurance of the safety 
of the system can be incorporated with a typical agile development method. 
 
1.1 Research Problem 
 
Whilst the use of agile methods is seen by some as attractive – for example, there is 
evidence of increasing use in safety-critical domain (e.g. in the railway domain for Train 
control systems, automatic control, Doppler radar, Axle counters) - there are still many 
safety experts who express concerns. For example, Redmill [46] raises concerns about 
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whether Agile incremental development would be a "good thing" in the safety-critical 
system domain, and states that evolutionary delivery would not be. He raises the question 
of how the importance of safety features could be distinguished if we cannot envisage the 
working system early in the analysis process? Hazard 
identification and analysis cannot be carried out on a system in the absence of a design. As 
is clear from the literature reviewed in Chapter Two below, the question of how to 
integrate Agile methods and Safety Assurance is not new (see related work section). But 
there is one particular area of practice that remains neglected in the existing work – namely 
the integration of safety (assurance) case development with an agile approach. 
 
A safety case is the argument and evidence that establishes the acceptable safety of safety-
critical system [29]. It is normally prepared (by the developer) and assessed (by an 
independent assessor or regulator) as part of safety critical systems development. Safety 
cases are an increasingly widespread approach to the management of assurance [47]. 
Structured argumentation approaches (such as the use of the Goal Structuring Notation – 
GSN - [48]) have become popular as a means of explicitly representing the arguments (and 
links to evidence) contained within a safety case. In this thesis, we are concerned with the 
research problem of how assurance case development (including the incremental 
development of structured arguments) can best be integrated with a typical agile 
development method. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
We propose the following two research questions (RQ) concerning the relationship 
between Agile Methods and Safety-Critical systems: 
 
RQ1 What are the current concerns and opportunities voiced by safety-critical systems 
professionals regarding the use of agile development methods for safety-critical systems 
development? 
 
RQ2 What changes are necessary to the Scrum Process in order to address the 4+1 
Software Safety Assurance Principles? 
 
As will be outlined in Chapter 2, there has been significant development in recent years 
towards integrated methods for agile and system safety engineering. One notable example 
is the Scrum methodology, which incorporates processes and concerns from the IEC 
Functional Safety Standard 61508. However, what is missing in this work is any mention 
or treatment of the safety case. It is our concern to examine how this can be integrated into 
a certification process. It is infeasible for us to establish an entirely new integrated 
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approach within the timescales of the Masters program. Therefore we intend to base our 
approach on extending the existing work of Scrum to address safety case development. 
 
Our research will focus on investigating best practice evolution of GSN arguments as a 
means for safety case development as part of a Scrum process. We expect to develop 
guidance that will 
support the development of a goal structure as an integral part of this process. Incremental, 
or phased, safety case development is already recognized as a useful activity within safety 
engineering. It can be advantageous to release the safety case in incremental stages 
throughout the project to gain early acceptance of the project safety approach [49]. In 
addition, past work has suggested that safety case argumentation notations (such as GSN) 
can help with providing a lightweight mechanism for safety case evolution. By addressing 
the two research questions defined above, we aim to examine how at least one aspect of 
software safety assurance and agile development methodology can be usefully aligned. The 
following hypothesis is therefore proposed: 
 
It is possible and useful to successfully integrate software safety assurance case 
development within an existing agile development method (Scrum), in a way that can help 
address existing concerns. 
 
• "Useful" - In this context this means that it means that it helps support accepted 
principles of safety assurance 
•  “Successfully” – Assurance is provided whilst still enabling the process to be agile 
• "Existing concerns" - there are a number of concerns that people have expressed 
with using agile methods in safety-critical development (e.g. absence of necessary 
documentation).  These are discussed further in Chapter 3. 
 
Past work [48] has suggested that safety case argumentation notations (such as GSN) can help 
provide a lightweight mechanism for safety case evolution. Answering the two research 
questions defined above, we aim to examine how at least one aspect of software safety 
assurance and agile development methodology can be aligned within a GSN framework 
informed by the 4+1 principles. The principles are outlined in Chapter 4 below. We contend 
that this approach will address various existing concerns relating to the integration of safety and 
agile 
 
Useful needs to be that it helps both in the attainment of agility (i.e. we can build better software 
more efficiently) and the achievement and assurance of safety (i.e. we can better address safety 
concerns as and when they arise). As well the 1-to-1 semi-structured is to investigate the success of 
the proposed framework for safety case development within Scrum 
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1.3 Research methods 
 
In order to answer the research questions and substantiate the proposed hypothesis, a 
defined research method is necessary. Beyond the obligatory literature review, the research 
methods being used in this study are survey, peer review and interviews: 
 
• We will conduct a survey to investigate the practical problems which practitioners 
perceive and experience in integrating the two disciplines. The answers collected 
from this survey will help to establish a framework to promote an iterative 
approach of building and evaluating artifacts, in the context of a safety case, as a 
part of an agile development methodology (Scrum). 
 
• 1-to-1 semi-structured interviews will also be used with some of the respondents 
from our initial survey, the purpose of this interview study is to investigate the 
success of the proposed framework for safety case development within Scrum. 
 
As described above, we will investigate existing concerns from safety critical systems 
engineering professionals by eliciting their opinions through a survey. The feasibility, and 
practicality of the proposed integration of safety case development with Scrum will be 
judged through peer review using structured interviews. 
 
We have chosen these methods firstly because the lack of information from practitioners 
concerning the integration of Agile methodologies into safety-critical development. 
Secondly, whilst it is desirable to seek case study experience and evaluation of the 
proposed approach, it has not been possible to conduct a case study within the duration of a 
one year MSc by Research programme.  Given the timescales of the work, we assert that 
having practitioners’ views from the real world, scalable problems is perhaps more 
significant for problems of this kind than small-scale case study examples. 
 
The results from the research methods, survey and semi-structured interview helped us provide 
a clear direction in terms of the importance of incremental hazard analysis, safety requirements 
development, and assurance case development. 
 
We will gain from these methods offered one of the most feasible methods for gaining insight 
as to whether the proposed approach would be successful (i.e. support agility, not compromise 
safety) given that it was not feasible to run a trial software development during the timescales 
of the masters research programme, to evaluate how safety activities are currently being 
proposed within the Scrum method, and to help define a process model for how requirements 
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development, hazard analysis and assurance case development can be performed as in-
increment activities. 
 
The figure below indicates the steps of our research methodology, and indicates what needs 
to be done in future work in this area. 
 
                 1.4 Thesis outline 
  
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 1: This chapter introduces our work, research problem, questions, and methods.  
Chapter 2: Introduces the literature relating to safety critical systems engineering and 
agile methods when dealing with software development. It aims to give an overview of 
the various terms, safety standards, Agile methodologies, including their values and 
principles. The chapter provides an overview of the existing literature that specifically 
addresses the use of agile methods in the safety critical domain.  
Chapter 3: In this chapter we describe the results of our survey designed to elicit the 
opinions of safety practitioners as to the challenges and opportunities posed by the 
application of agile development methods in the field of safety critical systems 
development.  
Chapter 4: In this chapter, we present an initial proposal as to how Scrum can be modified 
to address the 4+1 principles of safety assurance.  
Chapter 5: In this chapter we describes the results of the interviews conducted to identify 
and address challenges associated with the integration of Agile methodologies into safety-
critical systems development.  
Chapter 6: concludes the thesis with a summary of the results, limitations and further 
work. 
 
             1.5 Summary 
 
Ultimately, this research will develop and evaluate a process model of an adapted version 
of Scrum that clearly integrates the activities of software safety requirements evolution, 
software hazard analysis and software safety (assurance) case development.  To support 
the assurance case development aspect of this process, the results from the survey and 
semi-structured interview have provided a clear direction in terms of the importance of 
incremental hazard analysis, safety requirements development, and assurance case 
development (i.e. they indicate clearly that these activities must be performed within an 
incremental, rather than simply being up-front or end-of-development activities). 
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Figure 1 Research Methods 
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Chapter 2 
Background and Related work  
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces important concepts pertinent to the thesis. These concepts are 
important for understanding the thesis challenges and recommendations. Firstly, we define 
basic concepts in safety engineering and discuss standard processes and techniques from 
that field. We then address essential issues from agile methods, introducing the agile 
manifesto and core values and principles. These are then illustrated through three examples 
of agile methodologies: Scrum, Extreme Programming (XP) and Scrum. Finally, we 
provide a summary of previous work which identifies challenges and proposes methods for 
integrating agile methods within safety critical systems engineering. 
 
2.2 Definitions of Safety Engineering Concepts 
 
2.2.1 Safety 
 
Safety has been defined in different ways in the literature and various domain-specific 
standards. Here, we illustrate some of the scientific terms about safety: 
 
Safety is a state in which someone or something is secure from the possibility of death, 
injury, or loss [1]. Safety as defined in MIL- STD-882D [79], Standard Practice for System 
Safety, is “freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, 
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment”. In addition 
safety is described as freedom from accidents or losses, however, it should be pointed out 
that no system can be absolutely safe, the aim in design a system is to be as much as 
adequately safe. Figure 2 illustrates the scope to which the concept of safety can apply, in 
terms of potentially impacted people, equipment and the environment. 
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Figure 2: Impacted populations within scope of 
safety [5] 
 
 
 
The concept of safety revolves around the related concepts of hazard, risk and mishap, 
which are closely entwined together [1]. These concepts are explored below. For the 
system to be made safe, the potential for mishaps must be cut down or eliminated. Any 
failure in any part of the system - whether mechanical, electronic, software or human - has 
the potential to cause injury or death and ultimately to lead to significant litigation [2] 
 
2.2.2 Hazard 
 
NPR 8715.3C defines a hazard as “a state or a set of conditions, internal or external to a 
system, that has the potential to cause harm” [5]. Hazards are caused by failures (discussed 
in Section 2.2.3 below). Examination of the effects of hazards effects is a way to determine 
system risks. 
 
In [3] Leveson indicates that recent technical advances in various fields such as science and 
industry have created new hazards. For example, developments that have occurred in the 
food industry, such as the increasing use of food additives, adversely affect public health. 
Similarly, large numbers of people may be harmed by unknown side effects of 
pharmaceutical products. Arguably, existing safety engineering strategies have limited 
impact on many of these hazards [3]. 
 
Hazard analysis identifies and lists potential hazards in the system design including 
subsystems, components, and interfaces for the intended use of the system in its intended 
operational context [62,63,7] and considers their effects. 
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2.2.3 Failures, Errors and Faults 
 
A failure is defined by Leveson as “the non-performance or inability of the system or 
component to perform its intended function for a specified time under specified 
environmental conditions” [7]. 
There are many reasons why a system might fail. Often, a failure is the result of an inherent 
weakness of the design or implementation. Failures also arise in the transition between a 
correct  and an incorrect service. 
 
An error: is that part of the system state that may cause a subsequent failure [16]. 
 
A fault: is the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error [16]. 
 
The above definition of fault and error indicates that faults are preconditions for errors: a 
failure happens when an error reaches the interface of a service and changes the service. In 
other words, an error may happen when a fault is active. Also, failure can be identified as a 
hazard. Finally, failures, faults, and errors are sometimes collectively referred to as defects 
[19]. 
 
2.2.4 Safety-critical Systems 
 
The literature contains many definitions for the term ‘Safety-Critical Systems’. Essentially, 
they all share the intuitive notion that the system is concerned with the consequences of 
failure: if the failure could lead to danger or loss, then the system is system-critical [6]. The 
term ‘safety-critical’ therefore refers to systems that either can cause harm or are 
responsible for preventing harm [26]. In general, ‘harm’ refers to loss life, physical injury 
or danger, economic loss or environmental loss. 
 
John C. Knight [6] classifies Safety-critical systems into traditional systems and non-
traditional systems. Traditional systems are active in the areas that have long been 
considered as safety-critical systems e.g. nuclear power, medical care, airspace, and 
weapons. In these areas, any failure can lead to death or disaster, loss of equipment and so 
on. However, there are some new types of system that have the potential for very high 
consequences of failure, for example transportation control systems. Knight considers 
these systems as non-traditional safety-critical systems. 
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2.2.5 Safety Case 
 
Safety cases are produced to provide argument and evidence to substantiate a claim that a 
system is acceptably safe to function. 
 
The purpose of a safety case can be defined as follows: 
 
“The best safety case should contain a clear, exhaustive and defensible argument that a 
system is acceptably safe in the designated frame.” U.K. Ministry of Defence Ship Safety 
Management System Handbook JSP430 [77] 
 “A safety case is a comprehensive and structured set of safety documentation which is 
aimed to ensure that the safety of a specific vessel or equipment can be demonstrated by 
reference to: 
 
• Safety arrangements and organisation 
 
• Safety analyses 
 
• Compliance with standards and best practice 
 
• Acceptance tests 
 
• Audits 
 
• Inspections 
 
• Feedback 
 
• Provision made for safe use including emergency arrangements [29]” 
 
As we can see from the above definitions, the U.K. Ministry of Defence focuses on some 
important elements. Furthermore, as we shall see later in this chapter, some of these 
elements are also the main goals for agile methods. 
 
The concept of the safety case has been introduced across many industries for example the 
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field of defence, aerospace and railway. So, in order to meet safety standards, it is 
necessary to provide a structured argument followed by evidence to support your claim, 
thus, argument and evidence are crucial elements of the safety case that must go hand-in-
hand [29]. Documenting safety arguments is considered beneficial in improving safety 
assessment and safety case maintenance [31]. 
 
One approach to representing safety arguments is the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). 
The purpose of a goal structure is “to show how goals are broken down into sub-goals, and 
eventually supported by evidence (solutions) whilst making clear the strategies adopted, the 
rationale for the approach (assumptions, justifications) and the context in which goals are 
stated.” [66] 
 
2.2.6 Safety Case Patterns 
 
Generic safety case patterns have been identified from the study of existing safety cases 
and safety standards, and from discussion with safety case practitioners. There are several 
published pattern catalogues, in which all of the patterns presented have been subjected to 
(at-least) peer review [48]. Software safety argument patterns present best practice in 
structuring and presenting software safety arguments. 
Hawkins [33] demonstrates that software safety argument patterns may be combined in 
order to construct a software safety argument for the system under consideration. The 
following argument patterns are currently described in Hawkins’s Pattern Catalogue: 
 
1. High-level software safety argument pattern – This pattern provides the high-level 
structure for a generic software safety argument. The pattern can be used to create the high 
level structure of a software safety argument either as a stand-alone argument or as part of 
a system safety argument. 
 
2. Software contribution safety argument pattern - This pattern provides the generic 
structure for an argument that the contributions made by software to system hazards are 
acceptably managed. This pattern is based upon a generic ‘tiered’ development model in 
order to make it generally applicable to a broad range of development processes. 
 
3. Derived Software Safety Requirements identification pattern - This pattern provides the 
generic structure for an argument that derived software safety requirements (DSSRs) are 
adequately captured at all levels of software development. 
 
4. Hazardous contribution software safety argument pattern – This pattern provides the 
generic structure for an argument that the identified DSSRs at each level of software safety 
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development adequately address all identified potential hazardous failures. 
 
5. Strategy justification software safety argument pattern - This pattern provides the 
generic structure for an argument that the strategy, which is adopted in a software safety 
argument, is acceptable given the confidence that is required to be achieved in the relevant 
claim. 
 
Later on we will explain more on how to integrate these patterns in the research. 
 
2.2.7 Safety Standards 
 
Nowadays “safety” is an obsession, which is healthy. The formal interpretation of “safety” 
for systems within safety-critical domains is the role of standards. There are different 
standards that address safety-critical systems and regulations; each one of these standards 
has a different philosophy. The core concepts of each standard depend on arbitrary 
variances in criteria and assessment that come from the broad collection of stakeholders 
[35]. For system developers, this results in the challenge of having dozens of criteria to 
fulfill and various assessments to provide. In addition, some of these standards provide 
generic approaches, while some are designed for specific domains or industries. Hatcliff 
[35] identified that there are many applicable safety assurance standards such as IEC 61508 
[38], ISO 26262 [39], EN 50128 [36], DO-178C [65], IEEE 7-4.3.2 [37] and IEC 
62304[32]. 
McDermid [34] shows that safety standards do not normally determine the software 
development process; however they may recommend processes and practices to be used in 
order to achieve particular safety levels. If the standards do not explicitly define the 
software process, we are surely permitted to ask whether we could use agile methods as 
long as the safety goals can be achieved. 
 
2.3 System Safety 
 
System theory started from the 1930s and 1940s. Initially these theories were developed  in 
response to the classical analysis techniques, to help cope with the increasingly complex 
systems starting to be built at that time [3]. The aim of the system safety is the reduction of 
losses to lives, systems and the environment. Therefore the main objective is to avoid 
hazards that can lead to loss or damage to the environment and to ensure the discovery of 
hazards to the fullest extent possible. 
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The US Air Force System Safety Handbook [78] provides the following definition of 
‘system safety’: “The application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and 
techniques to optimize all aspects of safety within the constraints of operational 
effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system lifecycle.” 
 
System safety is defined in MIL-STD-882D [79] as follows: “The application of 
engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to achieve acceptable 
mishap risk, within the constraints of operational effectiveness and suitability, time, and 
cost, throughout all phases of the system life cycle” [4]. NASA general safety program 
requirements [80] define system safety as the “application of engineering and management 
principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize safety... within the constraints of operational 
effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle [5]. 
 
System safety is thus a kind of process aim to manage the system, personnel, environment, 
and health accident risks that happen through the design and development of a safety-
critical system. The goal of a system safety program is to reduce or eliminate hazards 
through design, engineering and management. That can be through the application of 
engineering, and management principles. Moreover, techniques are employed to improve 
safety within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all 
phases of the system life cycle. That leads us to the question: can the principles and 
processes defined for agile methods contribute in the field of “system safety” for safety-
critical systems? 
 
2.4 System safety process 
 
MIL-STD-882D illustrates the essential aspects of the system safety process in eight 
principal steps, as presented in Figure 3: 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Core system safety process [4] 
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The system safety process is initially documented in the safety program plan, and is then 
carried through as all safety tasks are completed, including hazard analysis and reports. 
System safety is based on a lifecycle approach according on the idea that safety measures 
to manage risks and mishaps must be started as soon as possible in the life of the system. 
 
Safety processes run parallel to and complement system development processes [28].  
Safety process are structured around the notion of the hazard and its management: any 
changes with it can lead to danger or damage. For example, a System (airframe) - travelling 
down runway at circa 170 knots, without braking. 
 
2.5 Software hazard analysis techniques 
 
Regarding to (NIST 1993 National Institute of Standards and Technology)[81,67] Software 
hazard analysis “ eliminates or controls software hazards and hazards related to interfaces 
between the software and the system (including hardware and human components). It 
includes analyzing the requirements, design, code, user interfaces and changes.” 
 
The IEEE Standard for Software Safety 1228-1994 [82] describes the relationship between 
the system safety analysis and the software safety analysis. If we are going to talk about 
software hazard analysis, we need to understand the role of the software on the 
performance of the system safety functions, as well the performance of the system on the 
monitoring and controlling functions and the impact of the software throughout the system. 
Therefore, the Software hazard analysis should be carried out within the context of the 
overall design of the system, for both attributes and assigned tasks of the software that 
contribute to the system's ability to perform its assigned tasks [67]. 
It is also important to note that Software Hazard Analysis is part of Software Design, the 
main goals of the hazard analysis program are to understand and correct deficit, as well to 
provide secure information. J. Dennis Lawrence [67] introduced four types of actions that 
may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances: 
 
1. The system design may be changed to eliminate identified hazards which are 
affected by software or are not adequately handled by software, or to reduce the 
hazards to acceptable levels, or to adjust the system architecture so that identified 
hazards are compensated by defense-in-depth. 
 
2. The software design may be changed to eliminate identified hazards, or reduce 
them to acceptable levels. 
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3. The quality of the software may be improved sufficiently to reduce the probability 
of a hazard to an acceptable level. 
 
4. The application system may be rejected if it is considered too hazardous. 
 
However, early hazard identification is the best approach. Thus it might be argued that one 
benefit of using agile methods is that they should be helpful in encouraging early and 
iterative evaluation that could reveal hazards and enable responsive introduction of risk 
reduction measures. 
 
2.6 Agile Background 
 
In this section, we introduce basic concepts from Agile Methods. This foundation is 
essential for comprehending the motivation of the thesis. Firstly, we introduce the Agile 
Manifesto and associated principles and values for agile methods. Then we describe three 
examples of Agile process methodologies: Scrum, Extreme Programming and SafeScrum. 
 
2.6.1 Agile Software Development 
 
Agile software development is an attempt to prioritise tasks in software development and to 
acknowledge that the user requirements change. Agile Methods can thus be defined as 
methods that try to focus on the primary goal of software development, i.e., the creation of 
working (defect-free) software [8] The Agile philosophy also implies being both effective 
and sufficient for the current situation. Agile development is a broad term that combines to 
characterise a certain group of development methods. The core of Agile development itself 
is not a definitive methodology: rather, ‘Agile development’ is umbrella term that 
accommodates and describes various similar methodologies, as well as core principles and 
values. 
The main idea of Agile was to create something “untraditional” and more effective, to 
improve product quality, and to reduce costs and the time to market [8]. Agile 
methodologies have increasingly gained respect in the software engineering field since the 
presentation of the Agile Manifesto in 2001 [40]. Agile Methods have started to be widely 
used as a development approach for software [32]. The majority of companies today use 
either traditional or agile approaches, or, increasingly, a combination of traditional and 
agile approaches [9]. 
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2.6.2 Agile manifesto and values 
 
In February 2001[8], the Agile Software Development alliance, which comprised 
seventeen independent representatives and several others considered to be leaders in the 
software industry, came together to introduce the “Agile Manifesto” [40,10]. The 
Manifesto they produced contained four core values, supported by twelve principles. These 
values and principles led to the evolution of lightweight methodologies, which were 
essentially people-oriented rather than process-oriented [27]. Figure 4 presents the Agile 
Manifesto values, which are discussed in more detail below: 
 
Figure 4 Agile Manifesto Values [40] 
 
 
Individuals and Interactions over Processes and Tools 
 
Individuals and interactions is one of the must important aspects for high-performing 
teams. This principle motivates software developers to consider the people who are 
involved in the development process as high priority. Note that this does not mean that 
processes are not important, but that the priority is for “People rather than processes”. 
 
Working software over comprehensive documentation 
 
One significant difference between Agile development and more traditional software 
development philosophies is the concern with working software. Agile software 
developments depend on the development artifact itself and create only those documents 
that are needed at every stage [8,10]. Progress is made by delivering small releases of 
software to the customer at set intervals. 
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Customer Collaboration Over Contract Negotiation 
 
Having a larger degree of customer involvement is vital, essential and logical. Logically, 
the customers have more knowledge about the product more than anybody. Therefore, the 
strategy in Agile Methods is to achieve customer satisfaction by regular engagement of 
customers rather than by considering the narrow confines of contracts. Moreover, it is 
recommended for customers to be involved in close daily interaction with development 
teams. In principle, such engagement should allow customers and developers to identify 
risks in the early stages of software development, which is what we seek in this research. 
 
Responding to change over following a plan 
 
Customers cannot generally predict all of their requirements a priori. Therefore, a gradual 
process, by which the requirements are incrementally understood by the customer and are 
delivered to and shared with the team, should be established [8,11]. Thus, Agile software 
development allows for changes in the development product, which derive from an 
increasingly clear understanding of the software. 
 
2.6.3 Agile Principles 
 
As we mentioned earlier, The Agile Manifesto introduces 12 principles which underpin the 
Agile philosophy: these principles are intended as a statement of what it means to be Agile, 
and to help people to identify and understand better what agile software development is 
centered around. As can be seen from the list below, the highest priority in Agile Manifesto 
is to satisfy the customer through early and continuous delivery of valuable software: 
 
1. Highest priority is to satisfy the customer. 
 
2. Welcome change. 
 
3. Deliver working software frequently. 
 
4. Business people and developers must work together daily. 
 
5. Build projects around motivated individuals. 
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6. Face-to-face communication is best. 
 
7. Working software is the primary measure of progress. 
 
8. Promote sustainable development. 
 
9. Continuous attention to technical excellence and good design enhances agility. 
 
10. Simplicity – the art of maximising the amount of work not done – is essential. 
 
11. The best architectures, requirements and design emerge formself-organising teams. 
 
12. Introspection – teams should regularly review itself and its processes to try and 
improve. [8.17]. 
 
 
 
2.7 Agile Methods 
 
Agile methodologies share the common essential idea that primarily concerned with the 
achievement of a working solution, in the context of changing user/stakeholder 
requirements. Although traditional development methods are, of course, also concerned 
with the development of a working solution, there is a fundamental difference concerning 
their flexibility in the light of requirements change [8]. Figure 5 illustrates this difference: 
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Figure 5:Difference Between Agile Methods And Traditional Methods [8] 
 
 
There are a number of existing agile methods: for example, Extreme Programming (XP) 
[12], Scrum [14,30], Dynamic Systems Development Method (DSDM) [18], Adaptive 
Software Development (ASD) [23], Crystal [24] and Feature Driven Development (FDD) 
[25]. In this section, we consider three of these methodologies in detail, and discuss the 
potential for their integration in the development of safety-critical systems. The examples 
we consider are: Extreme Programing (XP), Scrum and SafeScrum 
 
2.7.1 Extreme Programming 
 
XP (Extreme Programming) is a an incremental, lightweight methodology and discipline, 
that was conceived and developed to address the specific needs of software development 
[12] It seeks to produce software which satisfies the customer through a set of working 
releases that focus on the timely delivery of specific software requirements. Further, XP 
defines basic principles to govern the development process: Communication, Simplicity, 
Feedback and Courage. XP has been one of the most widely adopted of the Agile 
approaches, and is widely seen as placing an emphasis on individuals and interactions over 
processes [13]. These four basic principles have led to the following key ideas presented 
within XP: (1) Code in pairs, (2) Stay in contact with the   customer, 
(3) Create tests before coding then test heavily, (4) Short iterations, (5) Keep it simple, 
don’t anticipate: code for current needs, and (6) Collective ownership [8]. These principles 
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have a positive impact on software development. For example, as discussed in the next 
chapter, we have found from responses to our survey that there is a perceived need for 
these practices in traditional safety processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: XP Development Process [64] 
 
 
2.7.2 Scrum 
 
Scrum is an iterative, incremental process, which can be captured as interlinked two 
circles, the lower circle and upper circle, as seen in Figure 7. The lower circle represents an 
iteration of daily development activities that occur in sequence. The output of each 
iteration is an increment of the software product. The upper circle represents the daily 
inspection process that occurs during each iteration [14]. 
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Figure 7: Scrum Skeleton [14] 
 
 
 
Scrum is based on a small set of core values, principles, and practices [15]. In particular, 
the method defines three core team roles: the Product Owner, the Team, and the 
ScrumMaster [14]. 
 
 
Figure 8: Scrum Development Process [73]  
 
2.7.3 Scrum Roles 
 
Software development projects undertaken using the Scrum methodology are carried out by 
one or more scrum teams. Each Scrum team consists of three Scrum roles as follows: 
Product Owner, Scrum Master and Development Team. In this thesis, we have added one 
more element on top of the Scrum roles, i.e. Safety Member. This role is very important for 
projects which seek to use Scrum in the field of safety critical systems. We will discuss this 
addition in more detail later on. 
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The Product Owner 
 
The Product Owner is responsible for ensuring that the most valuable functionality is 
produced inside the Product Backlog, and for and turning the backlog items into developed 
features. Also,  the Product Owner chooses to develop product functionality that solves 
critical business problems [14]. 
 
Scrum Master 
 
The Scrum Master establishes what is necessary to help the team to be successful. In 
particular, the Scrum Master is responsible for teaching and championing Scrum and for 
helping the team to understand and embrace Scrum values and practices [15]. In addition, 
the Scrum Master acts like a lifeguard, protecting the team from outside interference and 
acting as a problem solver. 
 
Development Team 
 
The Scrum team is self-organized, which enables it to set up the best way for its members 
to achieve the team’s goals, sprint goals, estimate effort and review the product backlog  as  
determined by the Product Owner. The team typically consists of between five and nine 
people 
 [15]. Essentially, the team members must have good skills that match with the project 
goals and provide for the development of good quality software. The team members have 
collective responsibility for the success of each iteration and ultimately for the whole 
project [14]. 
 
Scrum Artifacts 
 
Scrum Artifact is the collective term used for the resources which are used by the Scrum 
process: product backlog and sprint backlog. 
 
 
Product Backlog 
 
Product Backlog items initially describe features which are required to meet the Product 
Owner’s vision [15]. The Product Owner is responsible for identifying, managing and 
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prioritizing the requirements and other contents that define the Product Backlog items, and 
for ensuring that the items are placed in the correct order. In addition, the Product Backlog 
is kept continuously variable, in order to meet the changing needs of the users/ customer. 
 
Sprint Backlog 
 
The Sprint Backlog describes the work as tasks: during a sprint, the Team selects tasks 
from the Product Backlog, potentially using it to develop product functionality for a given 
increment. Each sprint has a fixed start- and end- date/time. Each sprint should also deliver 
some identifiable, valuable, completed work to the customer or stakeholder – this is 
referred to as the  ‘Sprint Release’. 
 
2.7.4 SafeScrum 
 
Stålhane et al. [45] propose “Safe Scrum”. This was motivated by the need to make it possible 
to use methods that are flexible with respect to planning, documentation and specification while 
still being acceptable to the safety standard IEC 61508. Stålhane illustrates two kinds of Product 
Backlog within the SafeScrum: the Functional Product Backlog and a Safety Product Backlog.  
These backlogs are linked to show dependencies between the functional requirements and the 
safety requirements. Whilst there are obvious potential opportunities to extend this work to 
include safety case development (e.g. linking the documentation and traceability of safety goals 
with an explicit safety argument development) there is no discussion of safety case 
development in this work.  
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Figure 9: SafeScrum Model [45] 
 
 
 In addition, Safescrum has three main parts: The first part consists of the IEC 61508 steps 
needed for developing the environment description and the SSRS phases 1-4 (concept, overall 
scope definitions, hazard and risk analysis and overall safety requirements). The second part, 
which is the Scrum process and the last part, RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Main-tainability, 
Safety) final validation in each iteration. SafeScrum focuses on compliance with IEC 61508. 
Perhaps. One possible criticism of this work is that, by focussing on one standard, it does not 
'step back' and concentrate on the core intent of safety assurance and standards in general. 
 
2.8 Existing work on the use of Agile Methods for Safety-
Critical Systems 
 
The purpose of this section is to give an overview of the existing literature that specifically 
addresses the use of agile methods in the safety critical domain. As well contains a 
selection of literature concerning the following: 
 
1. Safety Principles and Agile Principles, and their relationship 
 
2. Integration of Assurance Processes and Agile Methodologies 
 
3. Agile Processes and Compliance with Standards 
 
4. Integrating Agile Practices with an Assurance Case. 
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5. Safety Process and Agile 
 
Ge, Paige, and McDermid [51] have published a paper on the iterative and agile 
development of safety critical software, in which they claim that there has hitherto been 
no tangible, documented deployment of agile methods on a real industrial safety-critical 
project. They mention a modular approach for building safety arguments incrementally 
using the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)[48]. The process they propose “...precisely 
captures the notion of sufficient up-front design...” They also illustrate how to use safety 
patterns and introduce the notion of a modular safety argument to enable the iterative 
development of safety argument. However, their conclusion is that agile practices may not 
change the nature of the entire safety-critical development procedure model, but might 
improve the agility of the development. Furthermore, it is important to note that this paper 
is intended as a conceptual proposal, and is far from industrial practice. 
 
Stephenson et al [52] propose an explicit representation of safety concerns in order to 
introduce Agile into the safety-critical development process: the Agile Health Model. 
Similar work has been done to introduce  agility  in security-critical systems,  using  an  
explicit  representation  of  security concerns known as Iterative Security Architecture. 
They study the relationship between safety-critical and agile software  development  
processes:  this  results  in  the  Agile  Health Model. Their main conclusion is that even 
though there are some problems with introducing agile methods in this area, there is 
nothing to prevent the use of agile methods in safety-critical development. They highlight 
that we need to add the certifying authority into the process. They also point to future 
work required to consolidate their findings. 
 
Vuori [53] analysed the agile values and principles that are expressed in the Agile 
Manifesto, and considered what they would mean in the safety critical context and how 
they might be demonstrated. From the analysis, Vuori developed a generic, simple model 
to present the most prevalent agile features. 
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Agile value Special meaning in a safety-
critical development context 
Practical principles to 
fulfil the meaning 
[we value 
more]Individuals and 
interactions [than]  
Processes and tools. 
 
Substance and understanding 
and sharing safety information 
is of the utmost importance. 
Safety information should 
be discussed and not just be 
read in documents and 
analysis report 
[we value more] 
Working software [than] 
Comprehensive 
documentation. 
True safety is more important 
than fulfilling safety 
requirements (though the latter 
are mandatory) 
We shall openly analyse 
safety and respond to real 
hazards first. Standards help 
in that, but we must not 
work only by standards. We 
need good systems, not 
systems that are documented 
as being good and safe. 
[we value more]  
Customer collaboration 
[than] Contract 
negotiation. 
While safety issues and 
features are important, they are 
always things that need 
collaboration so that we find 
practical, working solutions 
instead of non-robust ad-hoc 
solutions that cause more 
problems than they solve 
Active collaboration with 
customers on safety-critical 
features. 
[we value more] 
Responding to change 
[than]   Following a plan. 
When situation change, we 
need to assess the implication 
for safety immediately and not 
just blindly follow a project 
plan. 
Every development must 
keep track of safety issues 
and respond to changes 
immediately 
Principles Special meaning in a safety-
critical development context 
Practical principles to 
fulfil the meaning 
Our highest priority is to 
satisfy the customer 
Early releases shall be safe and 
able to provide value 
Safety of early releases 
needs to be validated; 
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through early and 
continuous delivery of 
valuable software. 
hazard and analysis, safety 
assessment and testing 
needs to be an ongoing 
activity. This does not 
necessarily imply test 
automation, but an actively 
ongoing testing activity. 
Welcome changing 
requirements, even late 
in  development. Agile 
processes harness change 
for  the customer's 
competitive advantage. 
Safety requirement shall not 
hinder making sensible 
changes that provide value. 
The product architecture 
needs to be flexible so as to 
encourage good changes 
that add value without 
compromising safety. 
Deliver working 
software frequently, 
from a  couple of weeks 
to a couple of months, 
with a  preference to the 
shorter timescale. 
-------- Periodical releases shall not 
compromised in their safety. 
Business people and 
developers must work  
together daily throughout 
the project. 
People who are responsible for 
safety or who are responsible 
for assuring it should work 
together with the development 
team. 
Gradually, safety and 
reliability analysis tasks can 
give to the development 
teams’ tasks, yet 
independent analysis can be 
required to be carried out by 
an independent party. 
Build projects around 
motivated individuals.  
Give them the 
environment and support 
they need,  and trust 
them to get the job done. 
People who are participate in 
the development must be 
motivated by safety too and 
they need to be given resources 
and tools to use that 
motivation. 
Participation in risk analysis 
is very good way of sharing  
information to be 
documented properly. 
The most efficient and 
effective method of 
Safety information is shared in 
face-face meetings and not just 
One metric of progress is 
how efficiently the process 
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conveying information to 
and within a 
development team is 
face-to-face 
conversation. 
assessment report. Safety 
issues need to be given place in 
meeting agendas. 
 
 
can deriver good, working 
software that is also safe to 
use and meets the safety 
requirements. 
Safety requirements need to 
be based on risk and safety 
assessment, not just 
standards. 
Working software is the 
primary measure of 
progress. 
True safety of the software is 
one measure of the progress; 
not just how designs and plans 
pass safety assessments. 
 
 
 
Work on safety on safety 
features needs to be planned 
and resourced realistically, 
just like any other 
development activity 
Agile processes promote 
sustainable development. 
The sponsors, 
developers, and users 
should be able to 
maintain a constant pace 
indefinitely. 
 
Working overtime exhausts 
developers and tester and 
makes them overlook essential 
factors. Tired people should 
not participate in safety-critical 
development any more than 
they should be exposed to risk 
in using machinery. 
 
Development of safe systems 
also benefits from experience, 
so it is not good if 
development if development 
change jobs due to exhaustion. 
 
 
Work on solid safety 
architectures and elegant 
integration of safety features 
to the general architecture is 
essential. 
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Table 1: Agile And Safety Critical Systems Software [53] 
 
Continuous attention to 
technical excellence and 
good design enhances 
agility. 
Safety, properly implemented, 
is technical excellence. Safety 
features need to be properly 
designed, not just add-ons. 
There must be absolutely no 
design flaws in safety systems. 
Simple base architectures 
for safety features should be 
designed. 
Simplicity--the art of 
maximizing the amount 
of work not done--is 
essential. 
Simplicity and 
understandability of safety-
critical features are essential 
qualities. Simple safety 
features are easy to adjust to 
the changing functionality. 
 
The best architectures, 
requirements, and 
designs emerge from 
self-organizing teams. 
The team should have freedom 
for the design of safety 
features, but not safety 
requirements. 
Yet all decisions need to be on 
solid analysis and proven(or 
provable) techniques. The 
person who is appointed to be 
responsible for safety issues 
has responsible for safety 
issues has the final vote on al  
decisions, whether she/he is 
part of a team or not. 
Present the safety 
requirements to the team 
clearly, let them understand 
what they mean and what 
their implication are and let 
the team do the designing as 
it best frits the whole 
system. Yet the results need 
to be validated in a 
sufficiently independent 
way 
At regular intervals, the 
team reflects on how to 
become more effective, 
then tunes and adjusts its 
behaviour accordingly. 
How well development of 
safety features has succeeded  
needs to be assessed as part of 
the team’s self-assessment. 
Reaching of safety goals as 
part of lessons learned-
agendas and such. 
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Paige et al [54] addressed the tension between the needs of safety critical software 
development, and the principles of agile processes. They analyzed agile processes and 
their applicability in the domain of safety critical software, and presented a number of 
concrete recommendations for adapting agile processes to the domain. Paige et al 
suggested that cross-referencing could be used to link safety experience stories to user 
scenarios to illustrate how certain failure conditions affect the correct execution of code, 
and illustrated the use of simulator “pipelined iterations” in order to perform acceptance 
test, reiterated for a small V model. The authors also observed that the safety case was 
generally developed as an external activity to software. In our approach, we implement 
the safety case incrementally inside Scrum. . 
 
2.8.1 Agile Processes and Compliance with Standards 
 
Most early theories talked about how to integrate agile methods in to the regulator 
environment [50]. Jonsson [55] illustrated the analysis of agile practices in regulated 
environment EN 50128 standard by mapping between EN 50128 requirements and agile 
practices. This mapping showed that all agile practices can be said to support some 
objective of the standard. Jonsson claimed that agile practices have the potential to lead to 
more efficient development, by reducing the gaps between customers, developer and tester. 
This can be achieved by short iterations, frequent integration and regular tracking of 
progress. Jonsson identified the fundamental challenge for the integration of agile 
processes into safety-critical product development as the need to find some way to produce 
all of the required documentation. He also stressed the importance of working with the 
quality assurance department and the safety assessor to ensure that the new practices are 
documented thoroughly. 
 
Marques et al [56] presents a model for airborne software, including CRD-RM (Certifiable, 
Agile, Reusable, and Disciplined Reference Model). This is an attempt to define a generic 
model that can be instantiated on each airborne software project, in order to increase 
efficiency without interfering with DO-178C compliance. The authors argue that some of 
the compliance objectives are achieved during each sprint. However, the reference model is 
specified only for the domain of airborne software certification. 
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Figure 10: Sprint Implementation Flow [56] 
 
 
 
In a similar vein, Fitzgerald et al [50] presented a case study to demonstrate that agile 
methods could be scaled to regulated environments. Their paper described a number of 
issues - quality assurance, safety and security, effectiveness, traceability, and verification 
and validation - and illustrated how they react with the model. The authors found that 
“living traceability” helps to establish compliance to standards and regulations, and 
concluded that agile processes can be augmented to work very well in regulated 
environments. The work also focused on how to implement an integrated model to achieve 
compatibility in terms of agility, safety/security, certification, and Quality Assurance. 
Fitzgerald et al made the important point that “the assumption of incompatibility between 
agile methods and regulated environments is more accidental than essential” [50]. 
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Figure 11: R. Scrum Regulated Implementation At QUMAS (Management and 
Compliance Solutions) [50] 
 
Coe and Kulick [57] examined potential sources of conflict between Agile principles and 
DO-178C certification requirements in the context of the inherent technical and procedural 
complexities in the aerospace domain. The Agile process emphasizes good communication 
and highlights the benefits of conveying information without rigorous process. However, 
DO-178C requires documentation to reflect organisations’ commitment to processes and 
tools. Furthermore, Agile processes recommend that the Working Software principle 
discussed in Section 2.6.3 above is preferable to documentation in terms of achieving 
requirements satisfaction. However, DO-178C requires documented evidence that process 
objectives relating to requirements have been satisfied. Coe and Kulick also observed that, 
whereas planning activites are part of Agile processes, the key element required for DO-
178C is evidence for certification. Lotfi [58] reduced that conflict by preserving the Agile 
Values through the process. They introduced a Model-Based Agile process, which 
combined Agile development processes and model-based engineering methodologies to 
satisfy a FAA-mandated process [83]. The goal of the Model-Based Agile process is to 
help promote the use of Agile methods in the field of safety-critical systems. 
 
Stålhane et al [45] proposed the “Safe Scrum” approach. This was motivated by the need to 
make  it possible to use methods that are flexible with respect to planning, documentation 
and specification while still adhering to the safety standard IEC 61508. Stålhane illustrates 
two kinds of Product Backlog within SafeScrum: the Functional Product Backlog and 
Safety Product Backlog. 
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These Backlogs are linked to show dependencies between the functional requirements and 
the safety requirements. The work of Guo and Hirschmann [75] expresses similar ideas. 
The key difference concerns how the Product Backlog is managed. They claim that a 
Safety Manager will oversee safety assurance throughout the whole process. In addition, 
the Safety Manager will check the Product Backlog for certain safety goals and ensure 
proper ranking and arrangement in the Release Plan. Whilst there are obvious potential 
opportunities to extend this work to include safety case development (e.g. linking the 
documentation and traceability of safety goals with an explicit safety argument 
development) there is no discussion of safety case development in this work. 
 
2.8.2 Integrating agile practices with an assurance case 
 
To date, there has not been any work which directly addresses the integration of Agile 
principles and methods in assurance cases for safety critical-systems. However, Lotfi, et al 
[58,59] illustrate a method for the iterative development of “security” features within the 
Scrum method which uses security assurance cases as a "technique for ensuring fulfilment 
of the security requirements of the feature". Their findings are broadly positive: they claim 
that the approach helps to minimize the cost of assurance of software security, and reduces 
the costs of mitigating threads. However, they do indicate some barriers to adoption of the 
method: as presented, the technique is not sufficiently scalable, and is costly because of the 
rework it requires. Furthermore, the authors note that” assumption limits the security 
reassurance of a new increment to the re-evaluation of a set of claims associated with the 
components”. Lotfi et al conclude, "that the agile software development approach does not 
prevent ensuring the security of software increments produced at the end of each iteration". 
The process they define is described in Figure 12: 
 
Figure 12: The Agile Software Development Process [58] 
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Other researchers have examined how conventional methods and techniques used for 
security assurance suit Agile methodologies. Beznosov and Kruchten [60] evaluated how 
well security assurance practices match the typical practices of Agile methods. For 
example, they identify that the informal review practices of agile methods match well, but 
that many agile approaches lack the external review and formal validation required for 
security. In addition, they identify that many security practices are independent of the 
adoption of agile practices – e.g. the use of security design principles. Similarly, Lotfi [59] 
(as described earlier in Section 2.8) found that some security assurance practices can be 
easily integrated. In particular, [53] begins to describe how security assurance cases can be 
used within Scrum to help iteratively develop security features. 
 
Finnegan and McCaffery [61] introduced a work in the filed of medical devices security 
assurance within the regulated software research center. They developed a framework to 
meet the requirements of this regulatory guidance through the use of assurance cases. They 
then used this framework to influence on a number of security related standards” six 
standards”, through the adaptation of Goal Structure Notation (GSN) argument pattern. 
This security argument pattern will facilitate to the regulators and healthcare organisations 
with a link between the security and risks, by mapping the six standards to 19 security 
capabilities to facilitate traceability for the regulators. Similar to Fitzgerald, et al [50] 
presented on how agile methods can be scaled to regulated environment. 
 
Finnegan and McCaffery [61] introduced work in the field of security assurance for 
medical devices carried out at the Regulated Software Research Center. They developed a 
framework to meet the requirements of regulatory guidance in that domain through the use 
of assurance cases. They then used this framework to influence a number of security 
related standards (“six standards” ISO 27799, ISO/IEC 27002,IEC 62443-3,NIST SP 800-
53,ISO/IEC, 15408-2, ISO/IEC  15408-3.). 
Their assurance approach is documented through the use of a Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN) argument pattern. This security argument pattern is intended to provide regulators 
and healthcare organisations with a means to link security measures and risks, by mapping 
the objectives of the six standards to 19 security capabilities to facilitate traceability for the 
regulators. 
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2.9 Summary 
 
In this chapter we have explained some of the funcdamental concepts and practices relating 
to safety assurance and Agile methods in order to provide context for the remainder of the 
thesis. Moreover, we have presented an overview of the literature relating to the integration 
of Agile within safety-critical systems, highlighting previous successes, challenges and 
obstacles faced by the researchers. 
 
 
In the literature Stålhane et al [85] illustrate some of difficulties perceived in the 
integration of agile development and safety case. Stålhane describes the concern that safety 
case development does not directly contribute to the development of running software and 
only indirectly contributes to the test and verification activities.  They state that, 
"Documentation produced simply for the sake of compliance or assurance is considered by 
some to run counter to the agile manifesto’s idea of customer focus. Reuse of documents 
and use of document templates, however, can reduce the extra effort needed for building a 
safety case. Working with the safety case offers the potential to increase system 
understanding and will thus lead to a more efficient process" [85].  
 
However our work focuses on the satisfaction of 4+1 principles within an agile framework 
“Scrum”. Specially, the focus of the work is on assurance rather than being seen to comply 
with a specific safety standard. 
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Chapter 3 
Survey  
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we describe the results of our survey designed to elicit the opinions of safety 
practitioners as to the challenges and opportunities posed by the application of agile 
development methods in the field of safety critical systems development. In particular, the 
survey explored the relationship between three key activities in safety engineering and an 
agile approach – namely, safety requirements development, hazard analysis, and safety 
case development. The results of this survey are presented together with brief discussion of 
the implications for integration. 
 
3.2 Importance of research 
 
As outlined in the literature survey in Chapter 2, despite progress in the use of agile 
development methods in safety critical systems development (e.g. [45,50,58], there are still 
those with doubts about the potential for successful integration. There are also reported 
experiences [43] that  highlight the complementary nature of the iterative and incremental 
approach underlying many agile methods and recognised best practice in risk management 
in safety critical systems development. Rather than start with a theoretical evaluation of the 
compatibility of the principles of agile development with software safety assurance, we 
decided to draw out these experiences, opinions (and possibly preconceptions) by means of 
a practitioner survey. In particular, the survey attempted to draw out specific responses 
relating to the (possible) incremental and iterative nature of safety requirements 
development, hazard analysis and safety (assurance) case development. 
 
3.3 Survey Design 
 
The first section (8 questions) of the survey was designed to elicit information about the 
respondents: job role, knowledge and experience of safety critical systems engineering 
45 
 
practice and standards, and knowledge and experience of agile methods. The main body of 
the survey – which  is presented in the following section - was designed as a series of 
statements about the potential integration of safety engineering activities with agile 
development with respondents prompted for responses on a five-point Likert scale. To 
avoid biasing responses, both positive and negative statements about possible integration 
were included. In addition, some statements were designed with deliberate overlap and/or 
contradiction to check the consistency of the respondent’s answers. 
 
3.3.1 Survey findings 
 
This section displays and discussing the themes in the survey with graphs for illustration. 
At the end of this chapter, we will highlight the most important themes, which emerged 
from this part of the research. 
 
 
Q9. Please rate the following statement: “Agile Methods can be integrated with Safety 
Critical Systems Development”. 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 1 1 3.23%  
Mildly disagree 2 2 6.45%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
3 
 
3 
 
9.68% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 12 4 38.71%  
Strongly agree 13 5 41.94%  
Weighted Score : 4.10  
Total Responses 31  
 
 
Q9. We asked whether respondents thought that Agile methods could be integrated with 
safety- critical systems development. 41.94% of respondents Strongly Agreed, slightly 
followed by the number who Mildly Agreed 38.71%, these respondents indicated 
significant approval of integration between agile methods and safety critical systems. On 
the contrary, the figures for Nether Agree or Disagree 9.68%, Mildly Disagree 6.45%, 
Strongly Disagree 3.23% were very low. The result was an overwhelmingly positive 
response (80% Agree or Strongly Agree). That indicates an enthusiasm for integration. 
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Q10. Please rate the following statement: "Hazard Analysis is an ongoing activity that 
must be applied throughout the lifecycle". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 1 1 3.23%  
Mildly disagree 0 2 0%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
1 
 
3 
 
3.23% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 8 4 25.81%  
Strongly agree 21 5 67.74%  
Weighted Score : 4.55  
Total Responses 31  
 
 
Q10. We asked whether respondents agree that hazard analysis is an ongoing activity that 
must be applied throughout the lifecycle. The majority of respondents Strongly Agree with 
that statement 67.74%, a little over quarter 25.81% Mildly Agree. Neither Agree or 
Disagree 3.23%, Strongly Disagree 3.23% and 0% Mildly Disagree. The final result 
strongly supported the notion that these activities are iterative and incremental, and need to 
be revisited throughout software development. 
 
 
Q11. Please rate the following statement: "As well as making a safe product, it is 
necessary to provide assurance of safety (for others)". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 0 1 0%  
Mildly disagree 0 2 0%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
2 
 
3 
 
6.45% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 6 4 19.35%  
Strongly agree 23 5 74.19%  
Weighted Score : 4.68  
Total Responses 31  
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Q11. "As well as making a safe product, it is necessary to provide assurance of safety (for 
others)"? Another interesting result is that 74.19% of the survey respondents Strongly 
Agree. 19.35% with this statement. The important point here is that there is strong 
recognition that the primary concern for safety engineering is not about just making a 
product safe, it’s also about how we convince 
others that the product is safe – i.e. assurance. The significance of this response is that it 
relates to the issue of demonstration of safety, e.g. with documentation, that others can 
independently review and evaluate. This response suggests that there is a need to establish 
an explicit safety case that be used to present the arguments and evidence of achieved 
safety to others. 
 
 
 
Q12. Please rate the following statement: "Compliance with standards is important". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 0 1 0%  
Mildly disagree 1 2 3.33%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
6 
 
3 
 
20.00% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 8 4 26.67%  
Strongly agree 15 5 50.00% 
 
 
Weighted Score : 4.23  
Total Responses 30  
 
 
Q12. Half of the respondents 50% Strongly Agree that compliance with standards is 
important, followed by slightly more than quarter 26.67%, Neither Agree or Disagree 20% 
and Mildly Disagree 3.23%. Overall, there is an overwhelmingly positive response 77% 
Agree or Strongly Agree, indicating the practitioners acknowledge the importance of the 
standards that prevail over the development and assurance of safety critical systems. 
 
 
Q13. Please rate the following statement: "Traceability (e.g. of safety requirements) is 
important".  
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
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Strongly disagree 0 1 0%  
Mildly disagree 0 2 0%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
3 
 
3 
 
9.68% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 4 4 12.90%  
Strongly agree 24 5 77.42%  
Weighted Score: 4.68  
Total Responses 31  
 
 
Q13. The majority of our respondents Strongly Agreed that traceability for safety 
requirement is important for software development projects 77.42%, and Mildly Agree 
scored 12.90%. By contrast, only 9.68% of responses were on the Neither Agree nor 
Disagree survey scale and both Mildly Disagree and Strongly Disagree scored 0%. Again, 
this is an overwhelmingly positive response that recognizes the importance of traceability 
90%. This is a specific illustration of the point about assurance that was raised in the 
response to Q11, in that traceability provides a means for, being able to demonstrate how 
requirements are decomposed and allocated. 
 
 
Q14. Please rate the following statement: "Software safety assurance requires system level 
knowledge". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 0 1 0%  
Mildly disagree 0 2 0%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
1 
 
3 
 
3.23% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 8 4 25.81%  
Strongly agree 22 5 70.97%  
Weighted Score: 4.68  
Total Responses 31  
 
Q14. There is a clear convergence between this question and the previous one. Our 
respondents appear to be Strongly Agreed 70.97% that software safety assurance requires 
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system level knowledge. Mildly Agree scored 25.81%, and Neither Agree nor Disagree 
3.23%. Again, the answers reveal overwhelming support for the statement that system level 
knowledge is essential for the safety assurance of software 96%. Whilst this is true, it 
should be noted that it relates to one  of the biggest problems encountered in safety critical 
software development, that it is hard (and potentially unsafe) to develop software without 
system level safety knowledge. 
 
 
Q15. Please rate the following statement: "Safety case development is an ongoing activity 
that must be applied throughout the lifecycle". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 0 1 0%  
Mildly disagree 1 2 3.23%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
3 
 
3 
 
9.68% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 9 4 29.03%  
 
Strongly agree 
  
5 
 
58.06% 
 
 
 Weighted Score: 4.42  
Total Responses 31  
 
 
Q15. This is one of the most interesting set of responses in the survey. 58.06% of the 
responses to affirm the importance of safety case development as an ongoing activity 
which must be applied throughout the lifecycle. This is followed by Mildly Agree with a 
score of 29.03% and Neither Agree or Disagree with a score of 9.68%. The lowest score 
was for Mildly Disagree 3.23%. These answers are an indication of the importance of 
safety case development. The responses suggest approximately 90% overall support for 
this concept. 
 
Q16. Please rate the following statement: "Regular evaluation of safety assurance / safety 
case progress should take place throughout the lifecycle". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigne 
d 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 0 1 0%  
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Mildly disagree 2 2 6.45%  
Neither agree or disagree 1 3 3.23%  
Mildly agree 8 4 25.81%  
Strongly agree 20 5 64.52%  
Weighted Score: 4.48  
Total Responses 31  
 
 
 
Q16. Another affirmation of the importance of safety assurance and the safety case. We 
asked whether regular evaluation of safety assurance and safety case progress should take 
place throughout the lifecycle. Around 64.52% of the respondents consider that regular 
evaluation of safety assurance and the safety case need to take place throughout the 
lifecycle, as demonstrated by their support for Strongly Agree on the survey scale. 25.81% 
of the respondent Mildly Agree, 6.45% Mildly Disagree, and finally a small percentage 
3.23% Neither Agree or Disagree with the statement. The most obvious position in the 
system lifecycle for review of the assurance case position is “preoperational” – i.e. just 
prior to the system being approved to enter service. However, staged safety case review 
(alongside staged production of the assurance case, as advocated in [1] and [2]) is far less 
risky (in project risk terms). If there are problems with the arguments and evidence being 
offered up by the assurance case it is desirable to find this out as early as possible in the 
lifecycle. 
 
 
 
Q17. Please rate the following statement: "Safety critical systems development should involve 
regular contact with the regulator / acceptance authority". 
Responses Count Assigned Weight % Percentage of total 
respondents 
1 - 1 1 1 3.23%  
2 - 2 1 2 3.23%  
3 - 3 7 3 22.58% 
 
 
4 - 4 6 4 19.35% 
 
 
5 - 5 16 5 51.61%  
Weighted Score : 4.13   
Total Responses 31 
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Q17. A little over half of the respondents 51.61% Strongly Agree with the notion that 
safety critical systems development should involve regular contact with the regulator / 
acceptance authority. 22.58% of the respondents Neither Agree or Disagree, followed by 
19.35% who Mildly Agree. Finally Mildly Disagree and Strongly Disagree each score the 
same 3.23%. 
 
 
Q18. Please rate the following statement: "Safety assurance and certification difficulties discovered 
late in the lifecycle (e.g. failure to establish an acceptable safety case) have resulted in significant 
cost and time overruns". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total 
respondents 
1 - 1 0 1 0%  
2 - 2 1 2 3.23%  
3 - 3 1 3 3.23% 
 
 
4 - 4 4 4 12.90% 
 
 
5 - 5 25 5 80.65% 
 
 
Weighted Score : 4.71  
Total Responses 31  
 
 
Q18. An overwhelming majority 80.65% of the respondents Strongly Agree with the 
following statement: "Safety assurance and certification difficulties discovered late in the 
lifecycle (e.g. failure to establish an acceptable safety case) have resulted in significant cost 
and time overruns". 12.90% Mildly Agree, and Mildly Disagree and Strongly Disagree 
each score 3.23%. The results therefore indicate strong overall support for this statement 
(>90%). This highlights the importance of “early and often” approaches to getting 
feedback on the development of an acceptable safety case. 
 
 
 
Q19. Please rate the following statement: "Software Safety Requirements can be defined 
once, at the beginning of the project, then used (unchanged) through the software 
development and assurance activity". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 20 1 64.52%  
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Mildly disagree 9 2 29.03%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
0 
 
3 
 
0% 
 
Mildly agree 2 4 6.45%  
Strongly agree 0 5 0%  
Weighted Score: 1.48  
Total Responses 31  
 
 
 
Q19. The most interesting part of this survey is that 64.52% of our respondents Strongly 
Disagree with the idea that Software Safety Requirements can be defined once, at the 
beginning of the project, then used (unchanged) through the software development and 
assurance activity. 29.03% mildly disagree, 0% Neither Agree or Disagree and 0% 
Strongly Agree. 6.45% of respondents Mildly Agree with the statement. The strong 
disagreement with this statement challenges any view of safety requirements that is static 
through the process. It challenges the view that requirements can be defined (principle 1) 
to cover hazards but then unaltered. In addition, the disagreement here is consistent with 
the strong agreement with the statement proposed in Q10 (Hazard Analysis is an ongoing 
activity that must be applied throughout the lifecycle). The response here highlights the 
fact that we cannot simply establish a safety requirements backlog at the beginning of 
software development and expect this to be unchanged through the software development 
process. 
 
 
Q20. Please rate the following statement: "Compliance with standards is the primary 
objective of software safety assurance". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 15 1 50.00%  
Mildly disagree 7 2 23.33%  
Neither agree or disagree 5 3 16.67%  
Mildly agree 3 4 10.00%  
Strongly agree 0 5 0%  
Weighted Score: 1.87  
Total Responses 30  
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Q20. 50% of the respondents Strongly Disagree that compliance with standards is the 
primary objective of software safety assurance, 23.33% Mildly Disagree, 16.67% Neither 
Agree or Disagree, 10% Mildly Agree and, unexpectedly, 0% Strongly Agree. The strong 
disagreement with this statement highlights the view that whilst standards are important 
(note the strong positive response to Q12) they are not the primary objective of safety 
critical systems development, which could (for example) be argued to be concerned with 
building a safe product. This suggests that our approach to integrating safety critical 
systems development and Agile should be aware of, and demonstrate compliance with 
standards (such as IEC 61508). We must, more importantly, address how integrated 
processes help us establish compelling arguments (and evidence) of safety. 
 
 
Q21. Please rate the following statement: "The interface and interaction between software 
engineers and safety engineers is 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 6 1 19.35%  
Mildly disagree 13 2 41.94%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
11 
 
3 
 
35.48% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 1 4 3.23%  
Strongly agree 0 5 0%  
Weighted Score : 2.23  
Total Responses 31  
 
 
Q21. As we can see from the results for this question, 41.94% Mildly Disagree with the 
statement that the interaction between software engineers and safety engineers is not well 
managed, followed by 35.48% who Neither Agree or Disagree and 19.35% who Strongly 
Disagree. By contrast, Mildly Agree scores 3.23% and Strongly Agree. The responses are 
therefore basically neutral to negative, showing that this is an area for improvement. If we 
get the ‘customer’ stakeholder involvement part of Agile right then this is an opportunity to 
improve on this experience. 
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Q22. Please rate the following statement: "Safety case development only needs to be 
considered at the end of the lifecycle after development is complete". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 24 1 77.42%  
Mildly disagree 5 2 16.13%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
1 
 
3 
 
3.23% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 0 4 0%  
Strongly agree 1 5 3.23%  
Weighted Score: 1.35  
Total 
Responses 
 
31 
 
 
  
 
Q22. 77.42% of respondents Strongly Disagree with the statement that safety case 
development only needs to be considered at the end of the lifecycle after development is 
complete. 16.13% Mildly Disagree, 3.23% Neither Agree or Disagree, 3.23% Strongly 
Agree and 0% Mildly Agree. This answer is the opposite of that indicated for Q15 (Safety 
case development is an ongoing activity that must be applied throughout the lifecycle), 
which emphasizes the perceived importance of safety case development throughout the 
lifecycle 
 
 
Q23. Please rate the following statement: "Safety problems, including safety assurance 
problems, are identified and managed early in the lifecycle as they arise". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 1 1 3.23%  
Mildly disagree 11 2 35.48%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
5 
 
3 
 
16.13% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 9 4 29.03%  
Strongly agree 5 5 16.13%  
Weighted Score : 3.19  
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Total Responses 31  
  
 
Q23. Responses to this statement are much more spread – a variety of experiences is 
clearly being hinted at. Just over a third of the participants 35.48% Mildly Disagree with 
the statement here, as compared with just under a third 29.03% who Mildly Agree. Two 
categories (Strongly Agree and Neither Agree or Disagree) have the same figure 16.13%, 
and 3.23% Strongly Disagree. So there is clearly some recognition that safety problems 
aren’t always identified early in the lifecycle. The fact that there are some positive 
indications and some negative ones from the spread of responses implies that there is room 
for improvement in the early identification of safety and assurance problems. Incremental 
development of assurance cases offers one potential means to supply this improvement. 
 
 
Q24. Please rate the following statement: "The level of effort spent in the design and 
assurance of a safety-critical system should be commensurate (in balance) with the level of 
risk posed by that system". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 1 1 3.23%  
Mildly disagree 1 2 3.23%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
3 
 
3 
 
9.68% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 12 4 38.71%  
Strongly agree 14 5 45.16%  
Weighted Score : 4.19  
Total Responses 31  
  
 
Q24. As we see, 45.16% of respondents Strongly Agree with the statement, followed 
38.71% who Mildly Agree and 9.68% who Neither Agree or Disagree. By contrast, Mildly 
Disagree and Strongly Disagree each score 3.23%. Prioritisation of assurance effort 
(according to risk) was thus recognized as important by 84% of the respondents. Together 
with the observations regarding evaluation, this suggests that incremental safety case 
development may be useful in helping guide an incremental software development process  
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Q25. Which of the following are recognised as features of agile development? 
Responses Count % Percentage of total respondents 
Active customer involvement is 
imperative 
 
26 
 
83.87% 
 
 
 The development team must be 
empowered to make decisions 
 
28 
 
90.32% 
 
 
 Requirements evolve but the 
timescale is fixed 
 
15 
 
48.39% 
 
 
 Capture requirements at a high 
level; lightweight & visual 
 
8 
 
25.81% 
 
 
 Develop small, incremental 
releases and iterate 
 
31 
 
100.00% 
 
 
 Focus on frequent delivery of 
products 
 
21 
 
67.74% 
 
 
 Complete each feature before 
moving on to the next 
 
11 
 
35.48% 
 
 
 Testing is integrated throughout 
the project lifecycle – test early 
and often 
 
29 
 
93.55% 
 
 
 
 
 A collaborative & cooperative 
approach between all 
stakeholders is essential 
 
28 
 
90.32% 
 
 
 
 
 Apply the 80/20 rule 4 12.90% 
 
 
None 0 0%  
Total Responses 201  
 
 
 
Multiple answers per participant possible. Percentages added may exceed 100 since a 
participant may select more than one answer for this question. 
 
Q25.This question was included specifically to check how much experience and 
knowledge participants had of Agile methods, specifically practices and principles. As can 
be seen from the table above, participants have some knowledge on agile practices, but 
knowledge is estimated through exercise and experience. 
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Q26. Please rate the following statement: "The process of software development is less 
important than the finished software product". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
 
Strongly disagree 
 
5 
 
1 
16.13 
% 
 
 
  
Mildly disagree 
 
7 
 
2 
22.58 
% 
 
 
  
Neither agree or disagree 
 
7 
 
3 
22.58 
% 
 
 
  
Mildly agree 
 
6 
 
4 
19.35 
% 
 
 
  
Strongly agree 
 
6 
 
5 
19.35 
% 
 
 
 Weighted Score : 3.03  
Total Responses 31  
 
 
Q26. As we can see from the table above, that the participants’ answers indicate a spread 
of different opinion ns here. This indicates that there is no unified opinion as to whether 
the software development process is less important than the finished software product. 
 
 
Q27. Please rate the following statement: "Documentation should be minimised during 
software development". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 5 1 16.13%  
Mildly disagree 10 2 32.26%  
Neither agree or disagree 7 3 22.58% 
 
 
Mildly agree 4 4 12.90%  
 
Strongly agree 5 5 16.13%  
Weighted Score : 2.81  
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Total Responses 31  
 
 
Q27. More than a third 32.26% Mildly Disagree with the idea of minimized documentation 
during software development posed in Q27. After that comes Neither Agree nor Disagree 
22.58% followed by both Strongly Agree and Strongly Disagree, each of which has 
16.13%. Mildly Agree, comes in last at 12.90% This indicates the importance of 
documentation. 
 
 
Q28. Please rate the following statement: "Requirements should be addressed according to 
their priority". 
 
Responses 
 
Count 
Assigned 
Weight 
 
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
Strongly disagree 0 1 0%  
Mildly disagree 3 2 10.00%  
Neither agree or 
disagree 
 
4 
 
3 
 
13.33% 
 
 
 Mildly agree 15 4 50.00%  
Strongly agree 8 5 26.67%  
Weighted Score : 3.93  
Total Responses 30  
 
 
Q28. Half of the participants 50.00% Mildly Agree and 26.67% Strongly Agree with the 
statement that, requirements should be addressed according to their priority. In total, 77% 
of respondents indicate broad agreement with the principle of requirements prioritization, 
which is a fundamental principle of Agile methods: developers are given space and 
freedom in the choice of tasks. 13.33% of respondents Neither Agree or Disagree with the 
statement and 10.00% Mildly Disagree. As we can see above the practitioners reject the 
idea that documentation should be minimised during software development.  
 
 
Q29. Which of the following practices of agile development can contribute safety-critical 
systems development and assurance? 
Responses Count % Percentage of total respondents 
None (Please leave a 
comment) 
 
0 
  
0%  
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All above 6 33.33%  
User stories 7 38.89%  
Small/short releases 8 44.44%  
Simple design 12 66.67%  
Refactoring 6 33.33%  
Continuous Integration 11 61.11%  
Pair Programming 9 50.00%  
Release Planning 10 55.56%  
Other (please specify) 0 0%  
Total Responses 69   
 
Multiple answers per participant possible. Percentages added may exceed 100 since a 
participant may select more than one answer for this question. 
 
Q29. The responses indicate clear support for the need for agile practices and principles, at 
the forefront came Simple Design with score of 66.67%. Continuous Integration scored 
61.11%, followed by Release Planning with 55.56%. Half of the participants (50.00%) 
prefer to use Pair Programming, less than half 44.44% indicate support for Small/short 
releases, 38.98% for User Stories 38.89%. 33.33% agreed that all of the principles and 
practices listed are important, and the same proportion support Refactoring. 
 
Q30. Which one of the following features of agile development could be in conflict with 
safety critical systems? (If you chose one or more please leave a comment) 
Responses Count % Percentage of total respondents 
Active user involvement 
imperative 
is  
3 
 
9.68% 
 
 
 The team must be empowered to 
make decisions 
 
5 
 
16.13% 
 
 
 Requirements evolve but 
timescale is fixed 
the  
13 
 
41.94% 
 
 
 Capture requirements at a high level; 
lightweight & visual 
 
10 
 
32.26% 
 
 
 Develop small, incremental releases 
and iterate 
 
4 
 
12.90% 
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Focus on frequent delivery 
products 
of  
10 
 
32.26% 
 
 
 Complete each feature before 
moving on to the next 
 
7 
 
22.58% 
 
 
 Testing is integrated throughout the 
project lifecycle – test early and  
often 
 
0 
 
0% 
 
A collaborative & cooperative 
approach between all stakeholders is 
essential 
2 
 
6.45% 
 
 
 
 
 Apply the 80/20 rule 12 38.71%  
None 4 12.90%  
Other (please specify) 9 29.03%  
Total Responses 79   
 
Multiple answers per participant possible. Percentages added may exceed 100 since a 
participant may select more than one answer for this question. 
 
 
Q30. We asked which Agile features could be in conflict with safety-critical systems. The 
participants’ answers indicate their concern with fixed timescales 41.94%, with applying 
the 80/20 rule 38.71%. Around a third of responses express concern about requirements at 
a high level, and the focus on frequent delivery of products (32.26% for each of these) 
22.58% of responses indicate concern with the need to complete each feature before 
moving on to the next. Some of the participants agreed that the notion that the team must 
be empowered to make decisions is potentially in conflict with safety critical systems 
principles. 12.90% feel that developing in small, incremental releases and iterating these is 
in conflict with safety critical systems principles. However, 12.90% believe that none of 
factors indicated in the question necessarily conflicts with safety-critical systems 
principles. Finally, 9.68% believed that active user involvement in development as a 
principle conflicts with safety critical systems methodologies. 
 
 
Q31. Which one of these practices could be beneficial for safety-critical systems 
development and assurance? 
Responses Count % Percentage of total respondents 
Active user involvement is imperative 21 67.74%  
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The team must be empowered to make 
decisions 
 
17 
 
54.84% 
 
 
 Requirements evolve but the timescale 
is fixed 
 
10 
 
32.26% 
 
 
 Capture requirements at a high level; 
lightweight & visual 
 
9 
 
29.03% 
 
 
 Develop small, incremental  releases 
and iterate 
 
18 
 
58.06% 
 
 
 Focus on frequent delivery of products 14 45.16%  
Complete each feature before moving 
on to the next 
 
7 
 
22.58% 
 
 
 Testing is integrated throughout the 
project lifecycle – test early and often 
 
29 
 
93.55% 
 
 
 A collaborative & cooperative approach 
between all stakeholders is essential 
 
22 
 
70.97%  
 Apply the 80/20 rule 1 3.23%  
None 0 0%  
Total Responses 148   
Multiple answers per participant possible. Percentages added may exceed 100 since a 
participant may select more than one answer for this question. 
 
Q31. The question here is the exact opposite of the previous question. Here, we found that 
the participants indicated that some Agile practices could potentially contribute to and be 
beneficial for safety-critical systems. 93.55% agreed that the principle of testing being 
integrated throughout the project lifecycle – test early and often - could be beneficial for 
safety-critical systems development and assurance. 70.97% agreed that a collaborative & 
cooperative approach between all stakeholders is essential for safety-critical systems. 
58.06% felt that developing in small, incremental releases and iterating these was 
potentially beneficial. 
 
 
Q32. Which of the following statements best represents your overall opinion regarding 
agile development methods and safety? 
 
Responses 
Count  
% 
 
Percentage of total respondents 
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Agile development methods are in 
conflict with safety critical systems 
development and assurance 
 
2 
 
6.67% 
 
 
 
 
 Agile development methods can 
sometimes be in conflict, and sometimes 
in harmony with safety critical systems 
development and assurance (add 
comment below) 
 
14 
 
 
 
46.67
% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agile development methods can be in 
harmony with safety critical systems 
development and assurance 
 
14 
 
46.67
% 
 
 
 
 Other (please specify) 12 40.00
% 
 
(Did not answer) 0 0%  
Total Responses 42   
 
Multiple answers per participant possible. Percentages added may exceed 100 since a 
participant may select more than one answer for this question. 
 
 
Q32. The results indicate a spread of opinion here: 46.67% of participants were agreed that 
Agile development methods can be in conflict, and occasionally in harmony with safety 
critical systems development and assurance, and the same proportion 46.67%  agreed  that  
Agile development methods can be in harmony with safety critical systems development 
and assurance, 6.67% agreed that Agile development methods are in conflict with safety 
critical systems development and assurance. 40.00% of responses indicated an “Other” 
response. There were a variety of additional comments made by those stating ‘Other’, 
including the following: 
 
“Depending	on	how	you	apply	agile	method.	Must	still	provide	documentation	as	
evidence.”	
	
“I	believe	they	can	be	in	harmony	if	one	considers	the	essential	complexity	of	the	
problem	space.	Agile	methods	help	us	address	complexity,	but	they	should	not	be	
applying	dogmatically	in	the	same	manner	as	other	non	safety-critical	domains.	
Likewise,	they	should	not	be	discounted	due	to	dogmatic	thinking	in	w.r.t.	[with	
respect	to]	traditional	SE	[Software	Engineering]	methods	-	that	one	has	to	do	it	
only	the	same	way	it	has	been	done	before”	
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“Work	is	needed	to	put	them	into	harmony,	but	it	can	be	done.”	
	
“The	standard	agile	practices	are	fine	but	must	be	supplemented	with	additional	
practices	for	safety	critical	systems”	
	
“Only	 when	 project	 management	 acknowledges	 iterative	 software	 and	
requirements	 evolution,	 the	 typical	 conflict	 between	 safety	 and	 software	
development	can	be	avoided.”	
	
“Agile	is	an	attitude,	not	an	ideology”	
	
“It	depends	on	the	complexity	of	the	project/product/service	and	also	the	ability	
of	the	teams/stakeholders	and	also	timescales.”	
	
“The	agile	 culture	 encourages	people	 to	 hack.	Agile	methods	adapted	 to	 safety	
critical	projects	often	just	look	like	normal	monolithic	methods	which	are	mostly	
what	has	to	be	done”	
	
“Depends	on	the	external	assessor	and	the	PoC	[Points	of	Contact]	he's	provided”	
	 “If	 they	 seem	 in	 conflict	 its	 through	 thinking	 too	 literally	 about	 popular	branded	agile	methodologies	and	a	shallow	understanding.”	
	“The	mindset	must	be	adjusted	as	to	how/what	to	test	and	form	documentation	
can	take”	
	
“Agile	 can	 support	 building	 safety	 critical	 systems	 and	 ease	 to	 build	 them	 -	
compared	to	using	other	methods.	Because	of	the	ongoing	attention	to	it.”	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
64 
 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
 
31 people completed the questionnaire. A broad range of industrial sectors was represented. 
We selected the participants from different roles, to get as broad a representation of 
practitioners as possible with respondents from health, aerospace automotive, railway, and 
the process sector. The majority of respondents represented organisations involving 150 
people or more. 87% had practical experience of safety critical system development. 77% 
had practical experience of the application of agile development methods. A broad range of 
agile methods were cited as the basis for this practical experience, with the most popular 
method (76%) being Scrum. The limited case study sample meant that not enough data was 
collected from only 31 practitioners, and more than 31 practitioners are needed. We had 
considerable difficulty finding practitioners who were sufficiently expert in both Agile and 
safety. The majority of our participants were based in the Germany, the USA Sweden, 
Norway, UK, and Italy. 
At the outset of the survey 80% either agreed or strongly agreed that agile methods can be 
integrated with safety critical systems development. Answers to the final survey question 
shows a more nuanced response with 48% believing agile and safety methods to be in 
harmony, and 45% believing that some agile and safety practices are in harmony whilst 
some are in conflict practices are in harmony whilst some are in conflict. The following 
themes emerge from the responses to individual questions: 
 
The response to statements regarding the processes associated safety requirements 
elicitation, hazard analysis, assurance case development and evaluation strongly supported 
the notion that these activities are iterative and incremental, and need to be revisited 
throughout software development. This challenges the view that safety requirements and 
hazard analysis can largely be performed outside of the sprint / incremental cycle 
 
• The need to provide assurance of product safety, as well as making the product 
safe was strongly recognized (>95%). This indicates the importance of establishing 
the safety case alongside development. 
 
• Whilst compliance with standards was recognized as important (50%) it was also 
recognized (>73%) as not being the primary objective of software safety assurance. 
 
• 75% recognized that software safety assurance should involve system level 
knowledge and engineers. (70%) also recognized the importance of involving 
regulators and evaluators during software development. This helps inform the 
definition of the traditional agile ‘customer’ role when applied in a safety critical 
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systems development context. 
 
• There was recognition (50%) that safety problems aren’t always identified early in 
the lifecycle. There was strong support (90%) for regular evaluation of safety case 
progress during development. Again, this suggests safety case development should 
be treated as an ‘in-increment’ activity. 
 
• Prioritisation of requirements (77%) and assurance effort (84%) (according to risk) 
was recognized as important. Together with the observations regarding evaluation, 
this suggests that incremental safety case development may be useful in helping 
guide an incremental software development process. 
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Chapter 4 
Integrating   Software   Safety   Assurance   
Principles with Scrum 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we present an initial proposal as to how Scrum can be modified to address 
the 4+1 principles of [84] safety assurance. We discuss the 4+1 principles in detail in 
section 4.2, and provide suggestions for the modification of Scrum targeted to each 
principle in turn. The following ‘design criteria’ motivated these modifications: change as 
little as necessary, keep agility as far as possible, do not compromise on safety assurance. 
We believe that the use of Agile in the field of safety critical systems is likely to present a 
number of challenges. These challenges, and our recommendations for how to address 
them, are also discussed in this chapter. 
 
Agile development traditionally promotes the view that the delivery of working software to 
the customer is the primary measure of progress [40]. However, for safety critical systems 
development it needs to be clear that the definition of ‘working’ software implies safety 
assured software. If the safety of the software isn’t assured, it cannot be considered as 
working software, because it cannot be used. Therefore our primary measures of progress 
(for safety critical software) must take into account both the status of the software and the 
status of the software’s safety assurance. As discussed in Chapter 2, Scrum is an agile 
development approach that uses an iterative, incremental process, and is based on a small 
set of core values, principles, and practices [15]. Scrum does not explicitly address 
software safety assurance. e software safety assurance into Scrum. 
 
4.2 The 4+1 challenges and recommendation 
 
The 4+1 Principles were developed by Kelly el al [76]. The value of using the 4+1 
principles as  the basis for this project is that the principles capture the spirit, or intention, 
of the standards, which provides us with a more abstract basis for attempting a 
modification / integration with Scrum than would a specific safety standard. These 
principles are constant across domains and across projects, and can be regarded as the 
immutable core of any software safety justification. The principles also help maintain  
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understanding  of the ‘big  picture’ of software safety  issues whilst examining  and 
negotiating the detail of individual standards, and provide a reference model for cross-
sector certification. 
 
4.2.1 Software Safety Assurance Principle 1: 
 
Software safety requirements shall be defined to address the software contribution to 
system hazards 
 
Kelly provides the following description of Principle 1 [76]: 
  
“Software by itself cannot be safe or unsafe. It is only when placed in a system context that 
the ‘safety’ of software can be judged by considering the contribution that the software 
could make to system level hazards. For example, software can play a role as the initiator 
of a causal chain of events leading to a system level hazard (and eventual accident). 
Software (e.g. when placed in the role of a protection system) can also play a role by 
failing to mitigate failures of other (non- software) elements. The first challenge of 
software safety assurance is to identify all of the ways in which software can contribute to 
system level hazards and to capture the necessary behaviour of the software in relation to 
these contributions in terms of a clearly defined set of software safety requirements at the 
system software boundary. (Note these behavioural software  safety requirements are 
distinct from the assurance requirements of software safety standards, e.g. to maintain 
traceability.)” 
 
Challenges posed 
 
• For assurance (e.g. certification), software safety requirements (and their 
treatment) must be easily identifiable within the total set of requirements being 
addressed. 
 
• Safety requirements can be positive functional requirements in their own right, 
constraints to be satisfied (e.g. timing) when addressing other requirements, or 
negative requirements (i.e. behavior to not be exhibited) 
 
• Safety requirements are therefore often associated and interrelated with core 
product requirements (i.e. requirements in the product backlog) 
 
• Safety requirements should not be addressed as an ‘after thought’ following 
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implementation of core product requirements. 
 
• Relevant (related) safety requirements need to be highlighted when addressing core 
requirements from the Product Backlog (so that they can be addressed as an 
integral of the implementation of these requirements.  
 
Recommendations for Scrum 
 
• A second Product Backlog – the Safety Backlog – should be maintained alongside 
the Product Backlog to explicitly store, manage and prioritise software safety 
requirements. 
 
• The Safety Backlog should record traceability between safety requirements and 
system hazards 
 
• The Safety Backlog should record traceability between safety requirements and 
‘core’ Product Backlog requirements (e.g. between a safety constraint and the 
function to which it relates) 
 
• The Safety Backlog is initially populated as a result of (deductive, ‘top down’) 
system level safety analysis performed prior to the software development 
commencing (i.e. analysis that identifies potential software contributions to system 
level hazards). 
 
• The Safety Backlog should also be populated through performing (inductive, 
‘bottom up’) hazard analysis (e.g. functional failure analysis) on the core Product 
Backlog requirements. 
 
• Both the system level safety analysis, and the software hazard analysis should 
involve the following stakeholders: the system team (as ‘customer’ to the software 
team), the system customer (e.g. system operator), competent safety engineers 
capable of carrying out the analyses, the safety regulator (as safety ‘customer’) 
potentially supported by additional independent and internal safety reviewers (as 
proxies for the regulator). 
 
• Maintenance of the Safety Backlog is the responsibility of a nominated safety team 
member from within the software team. This team member must ensure that they 
fully understand the source and rationale behind each of the requirements in the 
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safety backlog. (This may involve discussion with the stakeholders involved in the 
original safety and hazard analyses.) 
 
• When product requirements are chosen for a given sprint, the related safety 
requirements from the Safety Product Backlog should be identified, discussed and 
explained (by the nominated safety team member) at the beginning of the sprint. 
 
• One team member should be explicitly responsible for maintaining and explaining 
the safety product backlog.  
 
 
4.2.2 Software Safety Assurance Principle 2: 
 
The intent of the software safety requirements shall be maintained throughout 
requirements decomposition 
 
Kelly provides the following description of Principle 2 [76]. 
 
As the software development lifecycle progresses, the requirements and design are 
progressively developed and a more detailed software design is created. Having established 
complete and correct software safety requirements at the highest (most abstract) level of 
design, it must be possible to demonstrate that the intent of those requirements is 
maintained as the software safety requirements are developed, reinterpreted, allocated and 
decomposed. 
 
Challenges posed 
 
• If software safety requirements are reinterpreted, allocated or decomposed during 
development, the new safety requirements that emerge should be documented 
 
• If software safety requirements are reinterpreted, allocated or decomposed during 
development, traceability must be maintained between the original safety 
requirement and the new requirements or design that emerges. 
 
• When new requirements or design emerge as a response to the original requirement 
they must be reviewed to check whether they fully address the intent of the original 
safety requirement. 
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• Justification must be maintained as to how the new requirements and address the 
original safety requirement.  
Recommendations for Scrum 
 
• If software safety requirements are reinterpreted, allocated or decomposed during a 
sprint, the new safety requirements that emerge should be documented in the 
Safety Product Backlog, with traceability to the original safety requirement 
 
• As part of the Sprint review, those responsible for developing the original safety 
requirement must present the design (or refined requirements) solution proposed 
and new safety requirements that have emerged. 
• The Sprint review should attempt to check whether the proposed solution fully 
addresses the intent of the original safety requirement. 
 
• Independent stakeholders are required as part of this review. It should involve the 
nominated safety team member and potentially some or all of the following: the 
system team (as ‘customer’ to the software team), the system customer (e.g. system 
operator), a suitable internal safety reviewer (as proxy for the regulator’s position). 
 
• If it is determined that more time is required to assess the adequacy of the proposed 
solution (than the sprint review allows) then a more thorough review will need to 
be allocated as an activity to the following Sprint. Whilst this activity is taking 
place, ideally further implementation of the solution should be avoided (i.e. other 
requirements from the Backlogs should be prioritized) 
 
• The decomposition of the original safety requirement into the new safety 
requirements, and the justification as to the adequacy of this decomposition should 
be documented in the assurance case by the nominated safety team member. This 
should take place in the Sprint immediately following the review and will be 
presented as during the following Sprint review). 
 
4.2.3 Software Safety Assurance Principle 3: 
 
Software safety requirements shall be satisfied 
 
Kelly provides the following description of Principle 3 [76]. 
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Ultimately, it is necessary to demonstrate that any safety requirements allocated to software 
have been satisfied (i.e. present evidence to establish whether the required behaviour will 
occur in operation). It is important to present evidence that shows the satisfaction of safety 
requirements under anticipated operating conditions. For example, this requires presenting 
evidence that addresses satisfaction under both normal and abnormal (fault) conditions. 
 
Challenges posed 
 
• Verification evidence must be presented to demonstrate the satisfaction of any 
safety requirements claimed to be implemented. 
 
• Explicit traceability must be maintained between verification evidence and 
implemented safety requirements. 
• Verification evidence generated must be reviewed to check whether it fully 
addresses the intent of the safety requirement. 
 
• Justification must be maintained in order to indicate how the verification evidence 
demonstrates satisfaction of the safety requirement. 
 
Recommendations for Scrum 
 
• Daily Scrum meetings can be used to provide an early indicator for monitoring 
progress towards safety requirements satisfaction. 
 
• As part of Sprint review, those responsible for the implementation of a particular 
safety requirement must present the solution and explain how the intent of the 
safety requirement is fully satisfied. 
 
• The Sprint review should attempt to check whether the implementation fully 
addresses the intent of the original safety requirement, and should review the 
verification evidence presented. 
 
• Independent stakeholders are required as part of this review. It should involve the 
nominated safety team member and potentially some or all of the following: the 
system team (as ‘customer’ to the software team), the system customer (e.g. system 
operator), a suitable internal safety reviewer (as proxy for the regulator’s position). 
 
• After initial inspection in the Sprint review if it is determined that more 
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verification evidence is required (e.g. to satisfy the verification criteria of a safety 
standard) then further verification will need to be allocated as an activity to the 
following Sprint. It may be necessary for this verification activity to be performed 
by independent team members or teams (according to Principle 4+1). 
 
• The traceability of safety requirements to the verification evidence, and the 
justification as to the adequacy of the evidence set should be documented in the 
assurance case by the nominated safety team member. This should take place in the 
Sprint immediately following the review and will be presented as during the 
following Sprint review). 
 
4.2.4 Software Safety Assurance Principle 4: 
 
Hazardous behaviour of the software has been identified and mitigated 
 
Kelly provides the following description of Principle 4 [76]. 
Whereas Principle 2 is concerned with maintaining the intent of safety requirements in the 
presence of increasing design commitment, Principle 4 is concerned with the potential 
undesirable and unintended consequences of design and implementation decisions. 
Principle 2 is concerned with whether lower levels of requirements and implementation do 
what is required (intended). Principle 4 is concerned with whether the design and 
implementation does anything else that is considered unsafe. These potentially emergent 
hazardous behaviours could firstly result from design decisions that have unintended 
hazardous side effects. Secondly, they can also result from implementation (process 
execution) errors during the software development process – e.g. modelling errors, coding 
errors, and tool-use errors. It is necessary to ensure that assurance effort has been targeted 
at attempting to reveal both of these sources of errors. 
 
Challenges posed: 
 
• Unintended hazardous behaviour can emerge as a result of the design and 
implementation of both safety and core requirements and therefore has to be 
identified in both cases. 
 
• Where new hazardous behaviour is identified new safety requirements must be 
defined to manage this behaviour 
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• Identifying hazardous behaviour can require system-level domain expertise from 
outside of the software development team. 
 
Recommendations for Scrum 
 
• At the planning stage of a Scrum development the chosen modelling approach, 
implementation language, development environment and assessment tools should 
be documented. Hazard analysis should be conducted on the chosen languages, 
processes and tools to identify the potential for the introduction of implementation 
errors. Where the potential for error is identified it is necessary to provide evidence 
for non-introduction of error (e.g. tool qualification), controls for the minimization 
of error introduction (e.g. process guides) or means of demonstrating the absence 
of introduced errors (e.g. static analysis tools). Justification of the chosen strategies 
must be documented in the case.  
• Daily Scrum meetings can be used to provide an early opportunity to identify 
unintended side-effects emerging from a chosen implementation approach. 
 
• (Inductive, ‘bottom up’) Hazard analysis should be performed as part of Sprint 
review in order to identify  hazardous  side  effects  from  the  design  and  
implementation  activity 
undertaken during the Sprint. This hazard analysis should include a check of the 
implementation of the chosen strategy for dealing with implementation error 
introduction. This analysis should be performed in the context of the existing 
identified system level- hazards, but be open to the possibility of identifying new 
hazards. 
 
• Independent stakeholders are required as part of this hazard analysis. It should 
involve the nominated safety team member and potentially some or all of the 
following: the system team (as ‘customer’ to the software team), the system 
customer (e.g. system operator), a suitable internal safety reviewer (as proxy for the 
regulator’s position). 
 
• If it is determined that more time is required for the hazard analysis (than the 
Sprint review allows) then a more thorough review will need to be allocated as an 
activity to  the following Sprint. Whilst this activity is taking place, ideally further 
implementation of the solution should be avoided (i.e. other requirements from the 
Backlogs should be prioritized) 
 
• Where new hazardous behaviours (i.e. new software level contributions to system-
74 
 
level hazards) are identified, new safety requirements (to manage these behaviours) 
must be added to the Safety Backlog. 
 
• Where the Sprint activity and subsequent review relates to the implementation of 
safety requirements, the decomposition of the original safety requirement into the 
new safety requirements, and the justification of the identification and mitigation 
(through new safety requirements) of hazardous behavior should be documented in 
the assurance case by the nominated safety team member. This should take place in 
the Sprint immediately following the review and will be presented as during the 
following Sprint review). 
 
• Where the Sprint activity and subsequent review relates to the implementation of 
core (i.e. non-safety specific) requirements, and new hazardous behavior is 
identified, and new  safety requirements defined, the assurance case needs to be 
extended to include the new safety requirement. 
 
 
 
4.2.5 Software Safety Assurance Principle 4+1: 
 
The confidence established in addressing the software safety principles shall be 
commensurate to the contribution of the software to system risk 
 
Kelly provides the following description of Principle 4+1 [76]. 
This principle is expressed as ‘+1’, rather than principle number 5 because it underlies the 
implementation of the first 4 principles. Perfect assurance of the other four principles is 
unachievable. For example, it is impossible to prove that all hazards have been identified, 
and that all the necessary corresponding safety requirements have been identified. 
Consequently, we have to consider how to much effort to expend in addressing the first 
four principles, and how much evidence to generate. We have to decide upon a sufficient 
level of evidence to present. This principle states that the level of evidence needs to be 
proportional to the level of risk associated with the software in question. 
 
For a highly critical software-intensive system, the level of confidence in addressing the 
first four principles needs to be high. For a lower criticality system, the level of confidence 
can be lower. 
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Challenges posed 
 
• To implement this principle it is necessary to be able to identify the criticality of 
any software safety requirement 
 
• Implementing this principle will affect the amount of effort required, and the level 
of argument and evidence presented in the assurance case, to provide assurance of 
the first four principles. This can affect the length of Sprints, whether assurance 
activities take  place alongside implementation activities within Sprints, or need 
their own Sprint Cycles  to complete. This can also affect the type of stakeholder 
involvement required  (e.g. whether independent verification or assessment is 
required, or when customer stakeholder involvement is sought). It will also 
influence the level of rigour in modelling and implementation techniques, and the 
level of qualification required in tools used within the process. 
 
• Different standards have different approaches to defining required levels of 
assurance: IEC61508 sets a Safety Integrity Level according to the probability 
delta in risk reduction; DO-178C places more focus on severity; ISO 26262 
incorporates the concept of controllability of the vehicle. In addition, there are 
many differences in the recommended techniques and processes at different levels 
of criticality. If conformance to these standards is sought, the specific requirements 
will need to be identified and a conformance argument established as part of the 
assurance case. 
 
Recommendations for Scrum 
 
• The Safety Backlog should record the criticality associated with each safety 
requirement. This could be expressed using the language of a particular safety 
standards (e.g. Safety Integrity Levels – SILs) or through risk attributes (e.g. 
the severity of the hazard associated with a requirement, and the degree of 
contribution of the requirement to the hazard). 
 
• The criticality of Safety Backlog items can be used within Sprint planning to help 
manage project risk. For example, satisfactory implementation of high criticality 
safety requirements may be considered a project risk that should not be left until 
late Sprint releases. 
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• Before the Scrum development commences, it is necessary to decide how the 
assurance strategy will be moderated according to criticality. In particular, how the 
chosen approach to representing criticality will influence the following: 
 
 
o The amount and type of effort, stakeholder engagement, and assurance 
evidence required for the initial population of the Safety Backlog 
 
o Whether a dedicated safety team member is required within the software 
development team 
 
o The extent to which (system, regulator) customers are expected to be 
involved in the activities described in the first four principles. 
 
o The amount and type of effort, stakeholder engagement, and assurance 
evidence required in reviewing safety requirements development during 
Sprints (i.e. checking safety requirements validity) 
 
o The amount and type of effort, stakeholder engagement, and assurance 
evidence required in demonstrating satisfaction of safety requirements 
 
o The amount and type of effort, stakeholder engagement, and assurance 
evidence required in checking for implementation introduced errors and 
performing hazard analysis as part of the Sprint Cycles. 
 
• The criticality of chosen requirements for the Sprint (or requirements related to 
those chosen) should be highlighted at the beginning of the Sprint. In particular, it 
should be highlighted where independence cannot be demonstrated between the 
implementation of requirements of differing criticality, the higher criticality should 
be used. 
 
 
4.3 Summary and further work 
 
This chapter has summarized the 4+1 principles of software safety assurance and discussed 
the challenges posed when applying 4+1 principles to Scrum. We have also made initial 
recommendations as to how the principles can be accommodation within a Scrum 
development.  We believe that feedback on the proposed recommendation from safety and 
agile practitioners will help us to understand further the effective use of 4+1 within Scrum. 
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The purpose of the Safety Backlog is to keep all of the safety requirements in one place so 
that they can be explicitly identified and traced throughout the project development.  
As well, the safety backlog is the focus of safety assurance and a safety case, whereas items 
in the normal backlog (concerning the normal functioning of the system) are not expected 
to need the same attention. We believe it is easier to track the relationship between 'core' 
requirements and associated safety requirements by maintaining two separate (but 
interrelated) backlogs. Also it's possible to examine the consistency of all safety 
requirements contained in the safety backlog to examine the safety requirements for 
potential inconsistency (e.g. conflicting requirements for safe behaviour). 
 
In addition, the Safety Backlog forces a separation between safety requirements and other 
requirements. Safety requirement are usually stable (according to Stålhane [45]) but 
functional requirements will change to introduce new risks. When changes arise in the 
functional requirements, especially if changes are made to some aspect of the system which 
provides a safety barrier, it may be possible and desirable to update the safety 
requirements. Since safety requirements can introduce barriers to the system, it is wise to 
have them separately. 
 
In the next chapter, we describe the results of semi-structured interviews with both Agile 
and safety practitioners to review the challenges and recommendations presented above. 
Beyond these interviews, it will be necessary to demonstrate how these recommendations 
can be applied through illustrative case study examples, however this lies outside the scope 
of a one-year Master’s thesis. 
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Chapter 5 
Feedback  and  Evaluation  on  the  4+1  Scrum  
Integration 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The primary focus of our work is to identify and address challenges associated with the 
integration of Agile methodologies into safety-critical systems development. The 
recommendations in the previous chapter seek to assist and encourage Scrum users in using 
Scrum in the filed of safety critical systems project, while maintaining harmony with the 
core philosophy of the Agile  approach. In this chapter, we report on work to gain feedback 
on the proposals made in the previous chapter. 
 
In order to gain a deeper insight into the challenges identified for the integration of safety 
assurance into Scrum, and into the practicality of the recommendations made above, we 
conducted semi-structured interviews with safety engineers and Agile developers. It was 
decided that we should perform this validation step at this relatively early point in the 
development of the approach, because it was feasible given the short timescale of the 
Masters degree. 
 
Participants were presented with an overview of the challenges we identified as being 
associated with applying the 4+1 software safety assurance principles to Scrum, together 
with our initial recommendations as to how the principles can be accommodated within a 
Scrum development. Participants were taken through a series of questions designed to gain 
feedback on the feasibility of the approach, and were asked for an assessment as to whether 
the 4+1 principles can be addressed without compromising the core principles of agility. 
 
5.2 Aims of semi-structured interview process 
 
This study is part of the research under the High Integrity System Engineering Group, 
Computer Science Department, of the University of York. This introduce the 4+1 
Principles of Software Safety Assurance and their implications for Scrum, specifically, the 
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impact on the processes, roles and artifacts associated with Scrum development. 
Historically, there has been a reluctance to adopt agile methods within safety-critical 
systems development. However, feedback from our initial research in this area suggests 
that there are benefits to be  gained  from  the  application  of  agile  methods  to  safety  
critical  systems   [74]. 
Following this feedback we have done further work to assess how the 4+1 principles of 
software safety assurance can be integrated with Scrum, and have developed an initial 
proposal for how Scrum could be modified to better address the principles. 
 
5.3 Research questions and their motivations: 
 
This study specifically furthers our investigation into RQ1 and RQ 2 in Chapter 1. We now 
have initial proposals for modifications to Scrum to accommodate safety assurance 
concerns, and a fuller description of how assurance case development can be integrated 
with Scrum. In these structured interviews, we are concerned to preliminary evaluation the 
credibility, feasibility and efficacy of these proposals with practitioners. 
 
5.4 Participants and Interviews 
 
We interviewed 6 participants, from the academic and industrial domains in order to use 
their experience and insight to gain feedback on our proposed approach. All of the 
participants have been involved with Safety Critical-Systems, Agile methods, or both. We 
approached the participants because of their skills, experiences, and the extent of their field 
link to our research. The questions we asked aimed to explore a wide range of concerns, 
challenges and feedback on the integration of 4+1 principles into Scrum, by giving the 
practitioner's the liberty to provide detailed responses. Our participants were based in the 
UK, Sweden, the USA, and Norway. The limited semi-structured interviews sample meant 
that not enough data was collected from only 6 practitioners, and more practitioners are 
needed. The table below shows participant qualifications: 
 
PARTICIPANTS AND JOB TITLES 
DATE INTERVIEWEE JOB TITLES 
16/12/2015 Agile Coach and Certified Scrum Trainer 
24/05/2016 Kernel Developer 
15/03/2016 President and Managing Partner 
Development Practice  
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12/04/2016 Software Engineering Professor  
25/04/2016 Chief Evangelist  
14/05/2016 Senior Implementation Project Manager 
 
 
Interviewees were briefed with an introduction that explained the overall aims of the work, 
i.e. to explore perceptions around the 4+1 Principles of Software Safety Assurance and 
their implications for Scrum. Then the 4+1 principles were explained, along with an outline 
of our proposal for integrating these principles within a Scrum development. After the 
introduction, we asked for feedback relating to the proposal – picking out specific features 
one-by-one (e.g. our recommendations for team composition). The questions were 
designed to address two concerns: a) whether the proposed approach challenges agility and 
b) whether the proposed approach challenges safety assurance. The majority of the 
interviews were conducted over phone, email or via Skype. 
 
5.6 Interview Findings 
 
This section illustrates the responses from the feedback sessions that have been conducted 
during this empirical study. The responses are organized as follows. Each participant’s 
response is presented in a separate table. Each table is organized according to the proposed 
modifications of Scrum (i.e. as presented in the previous chapter). Responses are presented 
alongside the proposed modification. 
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OVERVIEW OF STUDY FINDINGS (Participant 1) 
 
 
 
                  Recommendation 
 
 
               Response from participants 
A second Product Backlog – the Safety 
Backlog 
 
 
 
 
 
New role in Scrum: Safety Team Member         
for maintenance of the Safety Backlog and 
ensure that they fully understand the source 
and rationale behind each of the requirements 
in the Safety Backlog. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily Scrum meetings can be used to provide 
an early indicator for monitoring progress 
towards safety requirements satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OK – already in SafeScrum. As an aside, 
we would like to point out the difference 
between the Safety Backlog and the SSRS. 
In our opinion, the safety backlog is a 
realization / concretization of the (SSRS). 
 
 
 
 
Interesting idea. This implies that we 
need a link from a functional requirement 
to the related safety requirements – i.e. 
safety requirements that are  included 
because the function could otherwise lead 
to a hazard. This could be part of the 
hazard log but is currently not considered 
in SafeScrum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why do we need early indicators? How 
can we identify a reasonable set of 
indicators and how can we use them? In 
our opinion, this is a lot of work with a 
doubtful effect. It might, however, be 
worthwhile if the proposed indicators 
could be collected and analysed 
automatically. 
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The Safety Backlog should also be populated 
through performing (inductive, ‘bottom 
up’) hazard analysis (e.g. functional failure 
analysis) on the core product backlog 
requirements. 
 
What do they think about the idea of 
documenting an assurance case ‘as they go’ 
during the Sprints? 
 
 
Sprint review should attempt to check whether 
the implementation ully addresses the intent of 
the original safety requirement, and review the 
verification evidence presented. Further 
verification will need to be allocated as an 
activity to the following Sprint. 
 
 
Hazard analysis should be performed as part of 
Sprint review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily Scrum meetings can be used to provide 
an early opportunity to identify unintended 
side-effects emerging from a chosen 
implementation approach. 
 
This is a standard approach based on e.g. 
user stories and part of the Hazard Log. 
 
 
 
 
Decomposition of safety requirements is 
performed in CIA (Change impact analysis) 
 
 
 
 
This goes for all requirements and should 
be considered together with  ‘normal’ 
requirements. This will involve the liaison 
between SafeScrum and RAMS (reliability, 
availability, maintainability and safety), 
 
 
 
Verification of safety requirements 
(RAMS) are outside the current version of 
SafeScrum. This might change for a 
future version, especially since the 
SafeScrum team has more system 
knowledge. At the present, only V&V of 
functional requirements are done inside 
the sprint team. We should move 
SafeScrum in a direction where part of 
the safety V&V is moved inside the 
SafeScrum team – if necessary together 
with the SafeScrum RAMS liaison 
 
Is this necessary? Seems like a lot of 
work with doubtful benefits. In our 
opinion, this is best done through the 
daily stand-ups and by having a safety 
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The criticality of chosen requirements for the 
sprint (or requirements related to those chosen) 
should be highlighted at the beginning of the 
sprint. In particular, it should be highlighted 
where independence cannot be demonstrated 
between the implementation of requirements 
of differing criticality; the higher criticality 
should be used. 
 
 
 
Where new hazardous behaviours (i.e. new 
software level contributions to system-level 
hazards) are identified, new safety 
requirements (to manage these behaviours) 
must be added to the safety backlog 
 
 
 
 
 
culture in the SafeScrum team. 
Even though it is possible to assign 
criticality to individual requirements or 
functions, In my honest opinion it is more 
reasonable to assign a criticality to the 
system and use this criticality throughout 
the project. Operating with different SIL-
values for different functions is not 
reasonable. 
 
 
 
OK. Done in CIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDY FINDINGS (Participant 2) 
 
 
 
                  Recommendation 
 
 
               Response from participants 
The Safety Backlog should record traceability 
between safety requirements and system 
hazards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I'm not sure if I entirely agree. I think the 
user stories need to include safety steps, 
issues, and concepts. As the team 
develops the software for the user stories, 
functional, non-functional, and safety 
requirements ought to be developed 
together. I'm not sure this will be easy to 
coordinate with two distict Backlogs 
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A Second Product Backlog – the   Safety 
Backlog 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Inductive, ‘bottom up’) Hazard analysis 
should be performed as part of Sprint review in 
order to identify hazardous side effects from 
the design and implementation activity 
undertaken during the sprint. 
 
 
 
 
 
Justification must be maintained as to how the 
new requirements and design addresses the 
original safety requirement 
 
 
Independent stakeholders are required as part 
of  this review. It should involve the 
nominated safety team member and 
potentially some or all of the following: the 
system team (as ‘customer’ to the software 
 
To me a "Safety Backlog" could easily be 
a database view on the principal 
Backlog (much like a team-specific 
backlog on a multi-team project can be a 
database view on the one master backlog 
-- show me only those stories from the 
master Backlog that team one will work 
on)... BTW, I am guessing that safety is in 
part a non-functional requirement that 
affects most other stories, which would 
lessen the need for a separate Backlog. 
 
 
 
Strictly speaking, this is reliability 
analysis since the impact cannot be 
assessed without understand how the 
other engineering disciplines contribute 
to safety in the scenario and context. But 
the idea of doing on-going hazard and 
safety analysis is a  good one. I think that 
an explicit role (Harmony process calls 
it "Safety Czar") allows for this 
independence of perspective. 
 
 
 
 
What about how the SW safety requirements 
will  be verified? 
 
 
Independence is particularly important 
for the developers of the verification 
procedures (testing, formal methods, etc). 
Surely they should participate in the 
review as well? 
 
85 
team), the  system customer (e.g. system 
operator), a suitable internal safety reviewer 
(as proxy for the regulator’s position). 
 
 
 
The traceability of safety requirements to the 
verification evidence, and the justification as 
to  the adequacy of the evidence set should be 
documented in the assurance case by the 
nominated safety team member. This should 
take place in the Sprint immediately    
following   the review and will be presented 
during the following Sprint revie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other Comment Generated 
 
 
 
 
4+1 Fundamental Principles of Software 
Safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is necessary to ensure that assurance effort 
has been targeted at attempting to reveal 
modelling errors, coding errors, and tool-use 
error 
 
 
 
 
 
It is very unusual for a Scrum team to 
have a separate V&V team but it is 
required by a number of safety standards. 
Probably should be called out here 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I know it may not be part of the 4+1 
framework but I'd also add "Software 
safety shall be ensured throughout all 
phases and activities of the software 
development process". Too many people 
think it's sometime addressed in only a 
single step or phase. 
 
 
 
 
Good to have this here. 
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OVERVIEW OF STUDY FINDINGS (Participant 3) 
 
 
 
                  Recommendation 
 
 
               Response from participants 
Does Agile have a culture of documentation? 
Especially if we developing safety critical 
system projects? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A second product backlog – the Safety backlog 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That is the great mess: that there is no 
documentation, that we encounter less and less 
about documentation, that is misunderstood what 
agile is. I would expect that skill sets of the 
people would be appropriate to deal with safety 
related concerns. For example one of my clients 
for medical devices, needs to follow some kind of 
regulatory documentation; sub-creating that 
documentation is the another output that the  
team create – just as we have the team support 
software so we have the team support 
documentation 
 
 
My first impression is that we do not 
want the Safety Backlog, In Scrum 
the Product Backlog is the stream of 
the work the team produces. I think 
safety related issues can be 
represented inside the normal 
Backlog: The product backlog is 
used to log user stories. These 
stories may involve functionality 
that is safety related to safety 
critical. Safety experts can review 
the stories with the stakeholders. 
The other well-known, well- used 
thing in Scrum is the use of 
accepting criteria to clarify the 
definition of “done”. The accepting 
criteria define what it means to be 
“done” with a particular user story. 
[Safety] considerations probably 
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Maintenance of the Safety Backlog is the 
responsibility of a nominated safety team 
member from within the software team. This 
team member must ensure that they fully 
understand the source and rationale behind 
each of the requirements  
 
 
 
 
 
Daily scrum meetings can be used to provide 
an early indicator for monitoring progress 
towards safety requirements satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
represent acceptance criteria. 
 
 
I agree with the idea of having 
Safety team member and one or 
more people safety related experts. I 
think that it is vital that if we doing 
safety critical systems ether the 
product owner is an experts in the 
field of safety 
 
 
 
 
The daily scrum is where the team 
essentially creates the plan for that 
day. We do that because new things 
are typically coming up every day. 
It is really appropriate for the safety 
experts to be present and to bring 
out their concerns. The biggest 
thing is to identify which members 
of the development team are 
working particularly with sensitive 
requirement: may be the safety 
experts need to spend some time 
after the daily scrum meeting to 
ensure that [these requirements are] 
understood. There is one more very 
common meeting in Scrum - it is an 
official activity - it is called the 
Backlog Refinement Meeting. This 
lasts for one hour, the purpose is for 
the stakeholder and the product 
owner to work with the development 
team to refine Backlog items. 
Understanding the upcoming stores 
not the one we are doing in the 
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Is a good idea to have the Sprint longer than 2 
weeks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Could the retrospective activity in Scrum help 
the safety issues? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sprint new, we make sure that we 
identified and redefine and we 
documented the important 
acceptance criteria or those story, 
that is the incredible time for safety 
experts to be present and see that 
safety issues does get captured   
 
 
 
 
The reason is, the shorter the Sprint 
the shorter the feedback (the Sprint 
review). The stakeholder community 
We share with all of the stakeholder 
community what the team has 
produced, we show them the new 
results, and the stakeholders 
understand it, and we see their 
reactions. We force contracting in 
terms of whether we are building 
the right product, specifically for 
safety critical systems 
 
 
That is an interesting question, the 
retrospective activity is really the 
time for the Scrum team to  be a 
better team; that meeting is not 
really about the product at all. The 
safety related staff [are concerned 
with] all aspects about the product. 
May be there are safety related 
things that might come up in the 
retrospective in terms of how the 
team is working. What I mean by 
tha ist if the team have ideas for 
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Other Comment Generated 
 
 
What about having Scrum and XP at the same 
time? Could that help safety critical projects? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is it a good or bad idea to have two scrum 
teams, the first working with the Safety 
Backlog and the second with the normal 
Backlog? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
work process change - like how they 
can do the work - that might 
improve the chances of discovering 
safety- related issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I totally agree. My experience is 
that very frequently Scrum teams 
are highly functional teams - 
eventually they almost adopt XP 
practices. For example, pair 
programing is a better way to create 
the code - with two people you are 
much more likely to find errors 
early. These  may be safety related 
or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bad idea, because every one who 
building safety critical system need 
to be aware of safety issues, and 
need be examining safety related 
issues, my be the another team do 
not think much regard for safety, 
and the anther safety team need to 
modify that to make it safe, it is 
much better to work on having 
aware of safety issues and what are 
the safety critical behavior need to 
be maintained.  
 
 
I think that Scrum is well suited for 
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What do you think about adapting Agile to 
safety critical systems, especially Scrum? 
 
 
 
 
software. It required complex work 
and particularly requires a number 
of experts that have different 
specialties to all be coordinated in 
order to get the final desire and 
products 
 
 
 
                        
 
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDY FINDINGS (Participant 4) 
 
 
 
                  Recommendation 
 
 
               Response from participants 
As part of the Sprint review, those 
responsible for implementation of a safety 
requirement must present the solution and 
explain how the intent of the safety 
requirement is fully satisfied. The Sprint 
review should attempt to check whether the 
implementation fully addresses the intent of 
the original safety requirement, and review 
the verification evidence presented.  
 
 
When product requirements are chosen for a 
given Sprint, the related safety requirements 
from the safety product backlog should be 
identified, discussed and explained (by  the 
nominated safety team member) at the 
beginning of the Sprint. 
 
 
 
 
Does this imply that the whole of a safety 
requirement will be met in one Sprint? What 
about cross- Sprint safety requirements? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is it permitted to break a safety 
requirement – satisfied in one 
Sprint? He highlighted some of the 
challenges that we have not 
addressed.  
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The Safety Backlog   should record traceability 
between safety requirements and system 
hazards 
 
 
 
It is necessary to ensure that assurance effort 
has been targeted at attempting to reveal 
modelling errors, coding errors, and tool-use 
errors. 
 
 
To implement this principle it is necessary to 
be able to identify the criticality of any 
software safety requirement 
 
 
 
 
Other Comment Generated 
 
 
 
 
Generally we trace requirements not to hazards, 
but to the risk. The mitigation of each risk 
becomes a safety requirement 
 
 
 
 
Do you include the introduction of 
race conditions in this? We find that 
one of the most difficult things to 
catch. 
 
 
Is this possible in isolation? Can you 
address the criticality of any one 
safety requirement? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Have you considered Scrum as a 
good way to produce a prototype (as 
recommended in 26262, 61508)? 
 
I wondered if it is worth mentioning 
an existence proof: QNX'S (QNX 
help build products that enhance 
their brand characteristics – 
innovative, high- quality, 
dependable) kernel has been certified 
to 61508 SIL3 and 26262 ASIL-D it 
was developed by Scrum. 
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OVERVIEW OF STUDY FINDINGS (Participant 5) 
 
 
 
                  Recommendation 
 
 
               Response from participants 
A second Product Backlog – the Safety 
Backlog 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is your opinion regarding principle two? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety Backlog -- I coach teams to 
have only one Backlog for the 
product, though it often divides into 
sections to feed multiple teams. Still I 
agree with your idea that some 
Backlog items need to address safety. 
Also agree that there should be a 
bottom-up analysis of hazards. Also 
agrees that we should have haz 
analysis in the cycle 
 
 
Intent of Safety Requirements Maintained - 
Keeping the epics and stories compact, and 
linked, goes a long way toward this. 
Traceability via tools has a place in this too. 
I would add that having a Sprint focused on 
stories that all focus on one major feature is 
a big help in 2 ways - less likely to overlook 
a risk or mitigation test, and productivity is 
higher because focus is concentrated in 
related areas  of the codebase. In my team, 
we'd sometimes tell the Product Owner that 
we could lower the points estimate on a 
group of stories if they could all be done in 
the same Sprint. Supporting principle two 
and saying that there  is practice within 
agile to keep backlog items - e.g. user 
stories linked. 
 
Practitioner also highlighted the fact that 
it’s ideal to tackle 'linked' items in one 
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Practitioner wants to highlight on some issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Practitioner agrees but makes a 
recommendation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sprint. This might relate to us in terms of 
trying to make sure that requirements and 
their corresponding safety requirements are 
tackled in the same Sprint.   
 
 
Safety Requirements shall be Satisfied -- One 
of the weakest traditional practices in my 
opinion has always been demonstrating safety 
through analysis. The rationale was that 
certain situations were too difficult to test 
explicitly, so a walkthrough of the source code 
is allowed. I can't recall having to resort to 
that even once in the 3-year Agile project my 
team did back when Agile was first emerging. 
We could test our embedded application on the 
target hardware or on a desktop PC on top of 
Windows. We could also  break out any task 
and run it solo on  the target hardware or on 
Windows. And we could inject error situations 
too. 
 
You have this: "The traceability of safety 
requirements to the verification evidence, 
and the justification as to the adequacy of 
the evidence set should be documented in 
the assurance case by the nominated safety 
team member.  This should take place in the 
Sprint immediately following the review and 
will be presented as during the following 
Sprint review)." I'd aim to do all this in the 
Sprint that implements the story, to avoid 
the errors and waste associated with context 
switching for team members 
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Practitioner agreeing but making a 
recommendation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you think about the identification and 
mitigation of Hazardous behaviour? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Practitioner raises an interesting question 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You have this: "The traceability of safety 
requirements to the verification evidence, and 
the justification as to the adequacy of the 
evidence set should be documented in the 
assurance case by the nominated safety team 
member.  This should take place in the sprint 
immediately following the review and will be 
presented as during the following sprint 
review)." I'd aim to do all this in the sprint that 
implements the story, to avoid the errors and 
waste associated with context switching for 
team members. 
 
 
Hazardous behaviour of the software has 
been identified and mitigated - Yes! Very 
much needed. I'd do the hazard analysis 
during the early sprints rather than at a 
sprint review. I coach teams to use one or 
more of the early iterations to deliver 
knowledge rather than    product   
increments  (or    a combination of both), 
especially for projects where there is much 
technical uncertainty. Also, as part of 
loading the Backlog, I'd use hazard analysis 
periodically to load new safety stories into 
the Backlog. You have a bullet point saying 
essentially the same. 
 
 
The confidence established in addressing 
the software safety principles shall be 
commensurate to the contribution of the 
software to system risk. -- Agree with all 
you've said here except that I wouldn't move 
the work to a later Sprint (as already 
discussed). Better to split the story to fit the 
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Other Comment Generated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sprint length, and have it disabled in the 
partial releases till enough of it is present to 
really release. 
 
 
 
General comment - I think the role you call out 
as safety team member can operate alongside 
the rest of the Agile team in the same Sprints. I 
believe that's in line with what you're saying 
 
 
 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDY FINDINGS (Participant 6) 
 
 
 
                  Recommendation 
 
 
               Response from participants 
Practitioner supportive of our proposal. “From 
the Recommendation Script “ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You capture just about all of the safety 
practices I advocate: 
- Assessing potential hazards "top 
down" early in design (this is 
where Fault Tree Analysis is 
helpful). 
 
- Including specific "safety stories" 
in the Backlog. 
 
- Establishing and maintaining 
traceability of the "safety stories" 
to the hazards which were 
identified 
 
- Making sure that safety features 
don't get lost or removed (this is 
why the features need to be clearly 
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commented as such) 
 
- Directly checking that safety 
stories have been implemented 
effectively, that is, that the 
mitigations work 
 
- Regularly reviewing status of 
safety issues to look for (a) new 
hazards arising from design, and 
(b) hazards as a result of errors 
 
- Conducting "bottom up" safety 
analysis as design emerges 
(FMEA, FMECA can be useful 
here) 
 
- Involving independent reviewers 
with specific product knowledge to 
look at safety controls 
 
- Tempering the safety efforts by 
the overall product risk level.     
 
The one point Osama makes that I'm not 
sure I agree with is that maintaining the 
safety items should be made the 
responsibility of a single team member. 
This is similar to the classic problem 
with quality 
- "QA is not our job."  My feeling 
is that in industries where hazards 
to life and limb are present (e.g. 
aviation, rail transportation, 
nuclear power, medical devices), 
awareness of and attention to 
safety need to be everyone's job.     
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Other Comment Generated 
 
 
 
It might be helpful to you to review the 
old AAMI TIR 32 – (the medical device 
software risk guidance) which was 
superseded by IEC TIR 80002-1. 
 
TIR 32 talks about many of the issues 
you discuss, and in addition describes 
such concepts of  "first point of software 
control" and "last point of software 
control." Since TIR 32 is now obsolete, I 
don't see any problem with sharing that. 
 
 
5.7 Identification of emerging themes 
 
In this section, we highlight some of the important findings from the 6 semi-structured 
interviews summarized in the preceding section. There were also some answers that were not 
included on the interview scripts, so we also report here on some of the potentially interesting 
issues raised by the participants. 
 
5.7.1 4+1 principles within agile and mapping agile to standards 
 
This section addresses differences in the practitioners’ opinions regarding the interaction of 
the 4+1 principles into agile and the integration of agile methods within one of the standards, 
and also addresses queries raised in the interviews. 
 
We should discuss one of the practitioner’s answers in more detail. His responses were often 
formulated with respect to the specific obligations of standards (i.e. his benchmark was 
whether the practice is compliant, in this case with IEC 61508). 
 
We quote some of our recommendations and the practitioners’ answers (R means 
‘Recommendation’; the practitioners’ responses are quoted in italics): 
 
R. The Safety Backlog should record traceability between safety requirements and ‘core’ 
product Backlog requirements (e.g. between a safety constraint and the function to relates). 
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“OK. This info is found in the Hazard Log which is a part of IEC 61508” 
 
R. The traceability of safety requirements to the verification evidence, and the justification as 
to the adequacy of the evidence set should be documented in the assurance case by the 
nominated safety team member. This should take place in the sprint immediately following 
the review and will be presented as during the following Sprint review). 
 
“OK. Traceability is already required in IEC 61508. The adequacy of evidence is not a part 
of IEC 61508. In addition, we see no good measure for adequacy. This will be a problem if 
we try to apply such a measure.” 
 
R. If it is determined that more time is required to assess the adequacy of the proposed 
solution (than the Sprint Review  allows) then  a  more thorough  review  will need  to  be  
allocated  as an activity to the following Sprint. Whilst this activity is taking place, ideally 
further implementation of the solution should be avoided (i.e. other requirements from the 
backlogs should be prioritized) 
 
“The V&V of safety requirements are taken care of in the RAMS [Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability, and Safety] process[es] – see diagram on separation of concerns – and is 
outside current SafeScrum. … implementations that fail here are returned to phases 1 – 4 in 
IEC 61508 and will go through CIA [Change Impact Analysis] phase 1“1 
 
R. At the planning stage of a Scrum development the chosen modelling approach, 
implementation language, development environment and assessment tools should be 
documented. Hazard analysis should be conducted to on the chosen languages, processes and 
tools to identify the potential for the introduction of implementation errors. Where the 
potential for error is identified, it is necessary to provide evidence for non-introduction of 
error (e.g. tool qualification), controls for the minimization of error introduction (e.g. process 
guides) or means of demonstrating the absence of introduced errors (e.g. static analysis tools). 
Justification of the chosen strategies must be documented in the assurance case. 
 
“OK. This is already done for all projects ran according to IEC 61508. The process is 
defined via the SIL value. We have two questions related to this issue. What do you mean by 
 
a. “Conducted to on the chosen language”? 
 
b. “Potential for errors” and how can this be identified?” 
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Another participant made a good point about the need to think beyond the framework of 
standards. In this respect, working to the 4+1 principles – which capture the general, rather 
than the specific intent of standards – could be more valuable: “More generic 4+1 principles 
as you do in this thesis, rather than restrict the work to one of the many standards ” 
 
The main criticism that has been made about SafeScrum so far is that the approach focuses on 
compliance with IEC 61508; people do not step back from individual standard and 
concentrate on the sprit of the standards (and of safety) in general. 
 
“More generic 4+1 principles as you do in this thesis, rather than restrict the work to one of 
the many standards ” 
 
1 Here the respondent is referring to elements of the SafeScrum process 
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R. When product requirements are chosen for a given sprint, the related safety 
requirements from the safety product backlog should be identified, discussed and explained 
(by the nominated safety team member) at the beginning of the Sprint 
 
Interesting idea. This implies that we need a link from a functional requirement to the 
related safety requirements – i.e. safety requirements that are included because the 
function could otherwise lead to a hazard. This could be part of the hazard log but is 
currently not considered in SafeScrum. 
 
In the literature review, we identified several challenges to the integration of Agile 
Methods to standards-based safety engineering (see, particularly, section 2.8 above). 
However, the empirical study carried out for this thesis aimed to reduce confusion in this 
area, by collecting more information about the integration of agile methods into the field of 
safety critical systems and by suggesting an approach to this integration which goes beyond 
“the letter” of a given standard. Our experience in the study provided some reassuring 
answers and motivation to continue to find better research results. 
 
5.7.2 Agile and Documentation 
 
Another practitioner provided the following comment on the lack of understanding as to 
how Agile methodologies deal with documentation: 
 
“Like the team support software, the same the team supports documentation” 
 
This practitioner commented that one of the biggest misconceptions of agile methods is 
that they are not willing to support documentation in the process. However, for example, in 
XP documentation is recognised as part of the development team’s responsibility [70]. 
 
5.7.3 Safety Backlog 
 
There are major differences of opinion among our respondents concerning our proposal to 
introduce a second Product Backlog, the Safety Backlog, to track safety-critical concerns 
through the Scrum-based process. As will be seen from the extracts quoted below, the 
practitioners’ most commonly-held opinion was that the Safety Backlog was non-essential. 
However, some of the literature promotes the importance of a Security Backlog [21], to 
helps to deal with the security “safety” issues in Scrum. 
The following extracts from our interviews indicate the practitioners’ differing views: 
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“Until I see really compelling evidence that there should be a separate backlog there is 
only ONE backlog that includes all of the work that needs to be completed. If safety is so 
critical to the effort then the development team should have on it people with deep safety 
expertise. The safety people might collectively form a safety community of practices but the 
individuals can and likely should be fully contributing members of Scrum development 
teams.” 
 
“Safety Backlog -- I coach teams to have only one backlog for the product, though it often 
divides into sections to feed multiple teams. Still I agree with your idea that some backlog 
items need to address safety. Also agree that there should be a bottom-up analysis of 
hazards.” 
 
“A safety requirement is a requirement derived from the initial system level safety 
analysis, but to the development team they are just a requirement the same as any other 
requirement that may have been developed from the system level. In some Agile 
approaches there is a separate ‘safety’ backlog (see Thor Myklebust [45]), in other cases 
within the overall product backlog those requirements that are safety related are just 
‘tagged’ to indicate they are safety related” 
 
The general view that we discern is that addition of the Safety Backlog may be a good idea, 
but that we need to conduct more investigation to see if that is true. 
 
5.7.4 Safety Team Member 
 
Almost all of the interviewees felt that our proposed addition of a team member with 
specific responsibility for safety issues was a sensible idea. We present extracts from the 
interviews below: 
 
“I agree with the idea of having a Safety team member and one or more safety related 
experts. I think that it is vital that if we doing safety critical systems the Product Owner is 
an expert in the field of safety.” 
 
I think the role you call out as safety team member can operate alongside the rest of the 
Agile team in the same Sprints. I believe that's in line with what you're saying. 
 
The Safety Team Member is our proposal, to improve communication between the 
development team and the independent assessor, to ensure that the safety requirements, 
safety criticality, and safety case will meet the costumer requirements, and to ensure that 
the development team has fully understood the safety requirements.  
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5.7.5 Hybrid agile approach and relationship to safety 
 
R. Hybrid approaches that combine two Agile practices within the area of safety critical 
systems should be developed, in order to achieve better safety results. There is some 
evidence from literature and the practitioners to support this recommendation, for example 
the Certified Software Development Process based on XP@Scrum for ISO9001:2000 [72] . 
 
I totally agree, in my experience is that very frequently scrum team are highly functional 
team, eventually adopt almost the XP practices, for example pair programing is the better 
way to create the code with 2 people you much likely to find errors early, my be safety 
related or not 
 
Some features of XP practices are likely to benefit the treatment of safety issues. For 
example Paige et al [20] suggest the use of Pair Programming which is likely to help in 
catching errors, identifying problematic code (that may need refactoring vs rewriting) and 
providing instant feedback on ideas. 
 
The challenges and observations identified in our semi-structured interviews, suggest that 
there may be considerable advantages in adopting a hybrid Scrum-XP approach for safety-
related projects, in order to take the benefits of both Scrum and XP approaches. 
 
5.7.6 Sprint Duration for Safety 
 
Agile practitioners generally recommend a Sprint length of one to two weeks. However, 
some of our interviewees argue that one to two weeks are not enough to satisfy safety 
requirements, and suggest that it is better to extend Sprints for safety-critical projects. 
 
Here we list some of the different opinions about the Sprint duration from the practitioners 
we interviewed: 
 
“The shorter the Sprint, the shorter the feedback” 
 
“We're generally concerned by the time it takes to assess safety issues as part of sprint 
planning. If the "Stakeholder consortium" is large (i.e. more than about 2 people), then 
how often does it meet and make decisions? (The Scrum approach seems to assume a 
single "product owner" who can make decisions _really_ fast - will this work if all safety-
related planning and decisions have to be taken by some big committee??)” 
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“In Agile the timescale takes precedence so if functionality cannot be completed in time it 
is removed from the current backlog. Consequently until an increment has been completed 
you cannot be certain what functionality will actually have been completed.” 
 
5.7.7 Queries and Recommendations 
 
In our initial interviews, we captured practitioners recommendations and queries 
concerning the integration of safety assurance into Agile methodologies, and also elicited 
their feedback concerning the challenges posed by this approach. These challenges and 
recommendations will be checked and examined in the next phase of our work, and 
appropriate ones will be implemented in future. 
 
Below, we have listed some of the participants’ queries and recommendations: 
 
Under "Principle 1", you talk of the Safety Backlog being "initially populated" by both "top 
down" and "bottom up" analysis. Totally agree, of course, but that seems to infer that you 
already have enough design and architecture to give you something to "iterate over" ... so 
you need to have done 
_enough_ architecture and design to do the safety analysis. This seems contradictory to 
Agile's "minimal design" mantra, but seems (at least to us) to be the crux issue - how much 
"up front design" is "just right" for a particular system? 
 
In P1 - you say that "when a product requirement is chosen for a given Sprint, the related 
safety requirements from the safety product backlog should be identified, discussed, and 
explained." Why not go further? Why not require that the safety requirements are 
implemented in the _same_ Sprint as the "product requirement". Put another way - would 
you ever want to implement a "feature" in a particular Sprint, but NOT implement its 
related safety requirements in the same Sprint? 
 
In Principle 4 - you talk about "justification of chosen strategies" being documented. I 
would go further and require justification of the _rejected_ strategies too. This is important 
in very long- lived projects, where you want future maintainers (years in the future) to 
know what you rejected and why... 
 
You don't talk about Refactoring. This is important - the Agile people say a refactoring is 
"Done" when "all the tests pass..." Big deal! In the context of maintaining a safety 
argument, how would you define "when a refactoring is done”? 
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We have discussed and summarized the practitioner’s opinions regarding our 
recommended approach and our initial analysis of the challenges it presents. These findings 
will be taken into consideration for any future work. 
 
5.8 Summary and Issues Arising 
 
In this chapter, we have reported on the results of 6 semi-structured interviews which were 
conducted in order to gain actual practitioners’ reactions to our approach to integrating the 
4+1 safety assurance principles within Scrum and our initial assessment of the challenges 
associated with the approach. Although the research sample is limited, the study has 
benefitted from the introduction of a more pragmatic perspective, which complements our 
rather theoretical viewpoint. 
 
We summarise the results in forms of answers to the two research questions we posed at 
the beginning of the study: 
 
RQ1 What are the current concerns and opportunities voiced by safety-critical systems 
professionals regarding the use of agile development methods for safety-critical systems 
development? 
 
We encountered some difficulties during the interviews. Foe example, on aspect that we 
briefly touched on was misunderstanding and lack of knowledge or awareness from both 
the Agile and  the safety practitioners concerning each others’ outlooks and work. 
Nonetheless, the semi- structured interviews have motivated us to propose further work 
involving interviews on a much larger scale in order to achieve better results. We need to 
move from the basic questions that we asked during the current research – i.e. “is it feasible 
to integrate safety into Agile methods?” – towards more specific questions, such as the 
following: 
 
• Is it permitted to break a safety requirement which has been satisfied in one Sprint? 
 
• Safety backlog - Yes or No? 
 
• Safety team member - Yes or No? 
 
• Hybrid agile approach - Yes or No? 
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• Sprint duration: 1 to 2 weeks? Or longer? 
 
• Independence is particularly important for the developers of the verification 
procedures (testing, formal methods, etc). Surely they should participate in the 
review as well? 
 
• What about how the software safety requirements will be verified? 
 
• Would it be desirable/possible to implement a "feature" in a particular Sprint, but 
NOT to implement its related safety requirements in the same Sprint? 
• Is Scrum a good way to produce a prototype (as recommended in 26262, 61508)? 
 
RQ2 What changes are necessary to the Scrum Process in order to address the 4+1 
Software Safety Assurance Principles? 
 
The findings indicate clear support for the recommendations that we propose to integrate 
the 4+1 safety assurance principles into the Scrum process in order to help demonstrate 
compliance with safety standards, and with our initial survey of the challenges presented 
by such an approach. Our recommendations stem from the use of the 4+1 principles to 
build on the strengths of the Scrum process to improve management of safety issues in 
system development. Finally the numbers of practitioners were not adequate for a good 
credibility, but more is needed. 
106  
Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Future Work                   
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
• This chapter summarizes all of the previous chapters, from the literature review 
through to the evaluation. In the literature review, we examined previous work in 
the area of safety assurance and Agile methods, to identify potential challenges and 
barriers for the integration of safety into Agile methodologies. This was followed 
by empirical research to collect a snapshot of current practitioner opinions. Our 
initial survey gave us a number of vital points that influenced the second stage of 
our research, the semi-structured interviews. For example, we retrieved the 
following substantial points from our initial survey: 
 
• The need to provide assurance of product safety, as well as making the product 
safe was strongly recognized (>95%). This indicates the importance of establishing 
the safety case alongside development. 
 
• There was recognition (50%) that safety problems aren’t always identified early in 
the lifecycle. There was strong support (90%) for regular evaluation of safety case 
progress during development. Again, this suggests safety case development should 
be treated as an ‘in-increment’ activity. 
 
• Prioritisation of requirements (77%) and assurance effort (84%) (according to risk) 
was recognized as important. Together with the observations regarding evaluation, 
this suggests that incremental safety case development may be useful in helping 
guide an incremental software development process. 
 
After that, we presented an preliminary analysis of challenges, which stemmed from the 
literature review and responses to the initial survey. We then made a series of 
recommendations as to how Scrum could be adapted to allow for the incorporation of 
safety assurance concerns. We subjected our analysis and recommendations to evaluation, 
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by means of semi-structured interviews with practitioners. 
The results from the semi-structured interviews were encouraging, and opinion was 
broadly supportive of our approach. That is indicated by the following key points from the 
semi-structured interviews: 
 
• One of the practitioners stated his support for Principal 2, saying that there is an 
established practice within Agile to keep Backlog items - e.g. user stories - linked. 
He also highlighted the point that it is considered best practice to tackle 'linked' 
items in one Sprint. This provides support for our attempt to ensure that 
requirements and their corresponding safety requirements are tackled in the same 
sprint. 
 
• Support for the inclusion of hazard analysis in the Sprint. 
 
• Support for the idea of a separate safety team member (the new role we proposed 
in this work). 
 
• Inclusion of specific "safety stories" in the Backlog. 
 
• Establishment and maintenance of traceability between the "safety stories" and the 
hazards which were identified. 
 
• Support for the observation that it is necessary to ensure that assurance effort has 
been targeted at attempting to reveal modelling errors, coding errors, and tool-use 
errors. 
 
6.2 Initial perceptions 
 
Our research began with a literature review that explored the theoretical implications of our 
topic, from both the safety assurance and the Agile perspectives. Some gaps and needs in 
existing approaches became clear during the review. In particular, some felt that agile 
development insufficiently recognized the need to provide assurance of product safety, as 
well as making the product. Furthermore, we found that there are only a few surveys and 
empirical studies concerning the possibility of integrating Agile Methods into the field of 
safety critical systems engineering. 
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Moreover, we used the preliminary results from the literature to support our hypothesis. 
Therefore, we conducted our initial survey, followed thereafter with semi-structured 
interviews to strengthen the evidence required to support the hypothesis. In conclusion, the 
reaction to the proposal to integrate the 4+1 safety assurance principles into Scrum was 
generally positive, however a number of concerns emerged from the evaluation. These key 
concerns were discussed in chapter 5. 
 
6.3 Initial Survey 
 
The initial survey attempted to draw out specific responses relating to the (possible) 
incremental and iterative nature of safety requirements development, hazard analysis and 
safety (assurance) case development. 
 
The survey successfully targeted practitioners with experience of safety critical systems 
development and agile development methods. The responses received from the survey 
indicated that the practitioners have a largely positive view on the integration of Agile and 
safety methods. By addressing specific practices in safety assurance, the survey responses 
also help inform the features of future integration attempts (e.g. concerning the placement 
of safety activities inside and outside of the increment ‘cycle’). 
 
6.4 The development of the initial proposal for the 
integration of the 4+1 principles 
 
Some researchers have attempted to tailor agile methods to comply with specific standards (e.g. 
SafeScrum and IEC61508). However, this risks over-configuring the agile method in such a 
way as to make difficult to apply to another safety standard.  Our approach sought  to look at 
the problems of addressing the more fundamental principles of safety assurance by adopting the 
emerging “4+1” safety principles [76] and investigating how a Scrum process challenges, and 
can be adapted to support, these principles.  Our aim was to  suggest the minimum of changes 
necessary to make the Scrum process support the assurance principles. By adopting a principle-
based approach, as well as getting to the ‘heart’ of the problem of safety assurance, it also 
provided us with greater flexibility in configuring the development and assessment process. 
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6.5 Semi-structured interviews 
 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with participants to gain feedback on our 
proposed approach. More specifically, the semi-structured interviews were designed to 
explore the general feasibility of the approach, and to provide an assessment as to whether 
the 4+1 principles can be addressed without compromising agility. 
 
The results of our 1-to1 semi-structured interviews gave strong indication that the 
practitioners felt that there is a significant potential for successful integration of the 4+1 
principles within Scrum. As discussed above, there were some issues where practitioners 
were concerned to focus only on one safety standard, and it was also the case that neither 
the Agile practitioners nor the   safety practitioners had a clear understanding of the 
outlook and work of the other group. However, we used these issued to inform a further set 
of questions. 
 
6.6 Limitations 
 
Our study suffered from some limitations which should be addressed in future work: 
 
a) Large scale empirical evaluation is simply not possible in the timescale of a Masters 
programme; 
 
b) We had considerable difficulty finding practitioners who were sufficiently expert in both 
Agile and safety – in the end, we were able only to interview those with an interest in the 
integration of agile and safety; 
 
c) The limited research sample meant that not enough data was collected from the 
practitioners; 
 
d) We needed to establish specific criteria in order to avoid deviation from the interview 
script. 
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6.7 Future Work 
 
In this section we will illustrate a number of potential work need to be achieved: 
 
As outlined above, there has been very little research to date concerning the integration of 
safety assurance concerns in Agile methodologies. Within the confines of the Masters 
degree, we have been able to conduct an initial evaluative survey and to propose a potential 
approach. It must be noted, however, that this represents only the preliminary stage of a 
line of research in this area. In this section we will illustrate a number of potential ways in 
which the initial work presented in this thesis could be expanded and validated in future. 
 
• It would be desirable for future researchers to conduct a pilot project. This should 
be formulated in such a way as to address the particular themes that emerge from 
our survey: for example, the pilot project could evaluate how difficult it was to 
establish safety requirements at the outset, and how much they change during the 
project. 
 
• Our initial survey in this area highlighted some areas of interest in the role of the 
safety case. Further work is required to explore how GSN safety cases could be 
linked to a notion of safety Product backlog within Scrum. The research indicates 
that existing assurance case activities need to be adjusted. 
 
• Software safety argument patterns provide a way of capturing good practice in 
software safety arguments. Future research could develop a pattern-based 
approach to integrating software safety cases, Scrum’s Safety Product Backlog, 
risk-based planning, and requirements-based evaluation. Software safety 
argument patterns describe the nature of the argument and safety claims that 
would be expected for any software safety case. 
 
• Peer review (through structured questionnaire) of our proposed approach as 
applied to a worked case study example should be conducted. 
 
• It would be useful for future researchers to engage in a larger-scale interview-based 
evaluation of an approach for safety case development within Scrum. In particular, 
research should address the development of pragmatic techniques to ensure that 
evidence to validate the safety case is developed and collected in all incremental 
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(Sprint) processes. 
 
• A realistic case study should be developed, to investigate where there are 
opportunities to build up a safety case as a part of an Agile development, to 
determine the risks and conflicts associated with this approach and how these risks 
could be mitigaed. 
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Abbreviations 
 
ACM Association for Computing Machinery 
ASD Adaptive Software Development 
CIA Change impact analysis 
CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration 
CRD-RM Certifiable, Agile, Reusable, and Disciplined Reference Model 
DSSRs Derived Software Safety Requirements 
DSDM Dynamic Systems Development Method 
FDD Feature Driven Development 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
GSN Goal Structuring Notation 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IEC  Functional Safety Standard 
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation 
MIL-STD Military Standard 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology  
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
QUMAS Quality Management and Compliance Solutions  
RAMS  Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety 
RQ Research Questions 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SSRS System Safety Requirements Specification 
XP                         Extreme Programing  
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